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I. INTRODUCTION
Small-scale farmers (SSF) and agricultural biodiversity have a
critical, yet often overlooked, role in healthy, nutritious diets and
ensuring the resilience of agricultural production systems in the face
of climate change.1 Dietary diversity is one guarantee of an adequate
supply of essential micronutrients.2 Without diversity in diet, people
can have enough food to eat, yet still suffer the hidden hunger of
malnutrition. Diversity of diet, founded on diverse farming systems,
delivers better nutrition and greater health with additional benefits for
human productivity and livelihoods.3 The world’s agrobiodiversity
base can be a source of affordable, nutritious food, if, as a global
community, we reflect its importance in policies and actions.4
Industrialized food systems characterized by monocultures and
high-cost inputs (from environmental, public health and economic
standpoints) have displaced SSF and eroded agricultural biodiversity
and the diversified systems of agriculture, of which both are a part.5
This trend has caused the “homogenization” of the global food supply6
1. See Susan H. Bragdon, Living Links Connecting the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals: Small-Scale Farmers and Agricultural
Biodiversity, 21 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 155, 184–85 (2019) (highlighting the
importance of small-scale farmers for agricultural biodiversity, sustainability in
farming and achievement of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)).
2. See EMILE A. FRISON, INT’L PANEL OF EXPERTS ON SUSTAINABLE FOOD
SYS., FROM UNIFORMITY TO DIVERSITY: A PARADIGM SHIFT FROM INDUSTRIAL
AGRICULTURE TO DIVERSIFIED AGROECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 39 (Nick Jacobs ed.,
2016) (stating that diversified farming would lead to the consumption of both macro
and micronutrients).
3. See Bragdon, supra note 1, at 160–61, 178 (finding that diversity of diet
would have nutritional benefits as well as increase human productivity and
livelihood).
4. See FRISON, supra note 2, at 61, 65, 70 (noting that agroecological practices
have increased because of consumer needs, however, governments should support
these practices to make them sustainable).
5. See Jonathan A. Foley et al., Solutions for a Cultivated Planet, 478 NATURE
337, 337–39 (2011) (pointing out that while the majority of land is used to grow
food for animals, it should instead be used to grow more food for human
consumption in a sustainable manner).
6. See Ashkan Afshin et al., Health Effects of Dietary Risks in 195 Countries,
1990-2017: A Systemic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017, 393
LANCET 1958, 1961 (2019) (emphasizing the suboptimal consumption of healthy
foods and nutrients and the high intake of unhealthy foods globally); see also Paul
R. Ehrlich & Edward O. Wilson, Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy, 253
SCIENCE 758, 759–61 (1991) (noting that the destruction of natural habitats is
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and an historic shift in the global burden of disease, so much so that it
is now primarily diet-related.7
Reversing these alarming, interconnected trajectories—SSF
displacement, the erosion of agricultural diversity, the
homogenization of the global food supply, and the epidemic of dietrelated disease—requires understanding the global institutions and
rules which enable them. Only then can these forces be countered with
concrete action and policy change. Today’s food systems are
embedded in a globalized world where a neoclassical economic
perspective has taken root.8 The greatest threats to SSF, the resources
they depend upon, and to SSF’s role in the production of sustainable
and healthy diets, are global policies which embody the fundamental
tenets of the neoclassical school.9 Simply put, these tenets reflect the
belief in the primacy of markets and private industry to provide all
kinds of goods and services, essentially unfettered and without
regulation,10 perpetuate a myth of government inefficiency and
ineptitude,11 and dismantle and reorient government through the
decreasing biodiversity and thus leading to a less diverse food system); Lori Ann
Thrupp, Linking Agricultural Biodiversity and Food Security: The Valuable Role of
Agrobiodiversity for Sustainable Agriculture, 76 INT’L AFF. 265, 269–73 (2002)
(explaining that developments in agriculture have resulted in food insecurity and
lack of diversity because only a fraction of the edible plant species are commercially
important and subsequently produced).
7. See Afshin et al., supra note 6, at 1961, 1963, 1967–68 (highlighting the
increase in dietary related deaths around the world).
8. See Boyd A. Swinburn et al., The Global Syndemic of Obesity,
Undernutrition, and Climate Change: The Lancet Commission Report, 393 LANCET
791, 797 (2019) (presenting the global obesity problem as an example of the
neoliberal economic governance model, embraced by governments and international
organizations, that fails to sufficiently address health risks).
9. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the
Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 470–72 (2004) (claiming that neo-liberal
reforms, specifically embodied by the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, have increased
agro-specilization and rural poverty and inequality).
10. See HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND
THE
SECRET HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 56–62
(Bloomsbury
Press,
2009) (2007) (discussing pre-neoliberal protectionist practices, the global
conversion to free-trade and free-market economic policies, and explaining how
highly industrialized countries have driven countries with developing economies to
adopt these economic policies in the neoliberal era).
11. June Sekera, The Public Economy: Understanding Government as a
Producer. A Reformation of Public Economies, 84 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 36, 49
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support of outsourcing, privatization, and internalization of market
mechanisms and metrics.12
Global markets affect most aspects of food systems—including SSF
and agricultural biodiversity.13 The belief in the primacy of the market
and of private industry, and their infusion into the operations of the
state, influences the policies and decisions of intergovernmental
processes and the implementation of treaties, regardless of their
ostensible stated purpose.14 An amalgam of international institutions
and laws arising at different points in time, with varying and often
conflicting intent, reflect these neoclassic economic principles.15 The
expression of these principles may be, in whole or in part, in a
particular regime.16 These principles are also evident in the
implementation of rules, both within and between institutions, where
a de facto institutional hierarchy emerges favouring the neoclassical
economic approach.17
Supported by economic instruments such as trade and intellectual
property (IP) rules and donor conditions, the modern system of
agriculture described above is steadily spreading across the globe,
(2018) [hereinafter Sekera, The Public Economy].
12. See id. at 49–50.
13. See Bragdon, supra note 1, at 158.
14. See Susan H. Bragdon & Carly Hayes, Reconceiving Public-Private
Partnerships to Eradicate Hunger: Recognizing Small-Scale Farmers and
Agricultural Biological Diversity as the Foundation of Global Food Security, 49
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1274, 1301, 1305 (2018) (noting that international agencies
and governments are influenced by and have created partnerships with large
corporations and, therefore, promote market-friendly policies).
15. See, e.g., Kathleen McAfee, Selling Nature to Save it? Biodiversity and
Green Developmentalism, 17 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 133, 140–41 (1999)
(discussing the Convention on Biological Diversity that usually leads to debate
between Northern and Southern countries that have differing interests and
approaches to solving problems of climate change).
16. See generally Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International
Institutions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 121, 123–24 (1996) (introducing the regime
theory that is centered around cooperation between states and its inability to address
the lack of international organization’s lack of enforcement).
17. See Ha-Joon Chang, Breaking the Mould: An Institutionalist Political
Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market and the State, 26
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 539, 542–44 (2002) (stating that interventions or state actions
are seen as rights and obligations once they become highly accepted in a society,
making the discussion of policies in international forums difficult because developed
countries view certain policies as rights or obligations while developing countries
see it as intervention since both sides favor free trade or market values).
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causing the displacement of SSF and the erosion of biological
diversity.18 For instance, treaties with the objective of the conservation
and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity, explicitly mentioning
farmers’ rights and the rights of indigenous and local communities, are
handicapped by embracing transactional mechanisms—an implied
buyer and seller—as the primary means to generate benefits needed to
support these communities and resources.19
The denigration, dismantling, and privatization of the state impedes
both agreement on, and enforcement of, human rights instruments of
direct relevance to SSF and agricultural biodiversity. 20 The market
cannot make or enforce rights or obligations; it is the role of
government to recognize and enforce human rights. The influence of
this orientation is clear, even in relatively young forum such as the
High-Level Political Forum on Agenda 2030 (and its 17 Sustainable
Development Goals).21 The predominance of neo-classical economics
provides the rationale and justification for influence and dominance of
this particular economic approach across very different global rules
and institutions.22
Despite a growing body of research and evidence, awareness of the
importance of SSF and agricultural biodiversity to the health of both
people and the planet is low, outside of specialized advocacy
organizations.23 There is significant and growing experience with
18. See Bragdon, supra note 1, at 177–78 (explaining that new production norms
ignore the importance of dietary diversity, small scale farmers, and diverse farming
methods that would ensure good nutrition and sustainability).
19. See, e.g., International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture art. 9, Nov. 3, 2001, 17 T.I.A.S. 313, 2400 U.N.T.S. 383 (expressing the
rights of farmers to share in benefits, participate in decision making and protecting
farmers’ traditional knowledge).
20. See McAfee, supra note 15, at 133–34 (highlighting the post neoliberal
version of environmental economics as the main influence of debates in international
agreements).
21. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business
Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, at 6–7, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31, annex (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights] (describing the state’s duty of protecting human rights).
22. See G.A. Res. 67/290, at 1, 3 (Aug. 23, 2013) (recognizing the need for
intervention of an intergovernmental actor to the implementation and achievement
of sustainable goals).
23. See McAfee, supra note 15, at 134–36, 138–39, 143 (the neoclassical
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policies such as community-supported agriculture, public
procurement from farm to school, farmers to restaurant, hospital or
other institutions, and fair-trade movements—all of which can support
SSF, agricultural biodiversity and the role they play in sustainable,
healthy diets.24 Experience in and evidence of agroecology’s
success25—of which SSF and agricultural biodiversity are an integral
part—is increasing, as is the spread of agroecological movements.26
Nonetheless, increased awareness and experience are important, but
are only part of what is needed to keep SSF and agricultural
biodiversity on-farm, and in situ sustainably producing healthy food
as a critical part of a food system that nurtures people and planet.27
Improving conditions within individual communities or regions will
approach is at the core of the environmental-economic theory that institutions and
agencies use).
24. See Miguel A. Altieri, Agroecology: The Science of Natural Resource
Management for Poor Farmers in Marginal Environments, 93 AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS
& ENV’T 1, 17–20 (2002) (recognizing the lack of implementation of agroecological
practices found in small farming communities on a large scale); see also J. N. Pretty
et al., Resource-Conserving Agriculture Increases Yields in Developing Countries,
40 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1114, 1114, 1118 (2006) (uncovering the obstacles in
finding ways to integrate agricultural sustainability and productivity with other
means of ensuring food security); Manuel Gonzalez de Molina, Agroecology and
Politics. How to Get Sustainability? About the Necessity for a Political Agroecology,
37 AGROECOLOGY & SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYS. 45, 55–56 (2013) (stating that there
is an urgent need for agroecology policies that can be implemented broadly).
25. See Altieri, supra note 24, at 20–21 (highlighting the importance of transfer
of agricultural technology between farmers and external agencies); see also Pretty
et al., supra note 24, at 1118 (noting the need to improve supply of agricultural
technologies to improve biodiversity); Gonzalez de Molina, supra note 24, at 49, 51,
55–56 (recognizing the importance of policies that promote sustainable
agroecosystems).
26. See ALL. FOR FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN AFR. & TANZ. ORGANIC AGRIC.
MOVEMENT, AGROECOLOGY: THE BOLD FUTURE OF FARMING IN AFRICA 5, 82
(Michael Farrelly et al. eds., 2016) (highlighting the case studies that have proven
agroecology’s success in creating food sovereignty); Agroecology Knowledge Hub:
The
Ten
Elements
of
Agroecology,
FAO,
http://www.fao.org/agroecology/knowledge/10-elements/en/ (lasted visited June 13,
2020) (identifying important elements of agroecology).
27. See PARVIZ KOOHAFKAN & MIGUEL A. ALTIERI, GLOBALLY IMPORTANT
AGRICULTURAL HERITAGE SYSTEMS: A LEGACY FOR THE FUTURE 5–6 (2011)
(explaining that small scale farmers in the current system have to compete in
commodity driven markets that are intensive and often subsidized puts them at risk
of their livelihood); Pretty et al., supra note 24, at 1114 (illustrating the result of
small-scale farmers’ success in developing farming practices that promote
sustainability, efficiency, and productivity).

2020] SMALL-SCALE FARMERS & AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY

7

not influence the evolution, much less the transformation, to a better
food system for all, if they are divorced from the global context.
Agroecological movements such as Via Campesina have been
enormously effective in many respects,28 yet agroecological
movements face significant challenges in developing comprehensive
strategies to engage with the breadth of global institutions and rules
that impact their ability to scale up and diffuse more broadly. This is
not to minimize the importance of local action, but to recognize their
geographic, and likely temporal, limitations, if the global institutions
and macro-level policies and rules are not fundamentally reoriented
and changed. This includes addressing issues of power, how these
institutions and their policies are shaped, and how these institutions
work to the benefit (or detriment) of specific constituents.
Section Two of this paper provides details how neo-classical
economic theory forms the foundation for the existing forces of market
supremacy, profit seeking, the disaggregation of complex problems,
corporate concentration, and state capture.29 This is the sometimes
invisible backdrop against which international institutions and rules
affecting SSF’s and agricultural biodiversity operate. A
comprehensive analysis of the evolution and status of all global
institutions affecting SSF and agricultural biodiversity is beyond the
scope of this chapter.
Rather, Section Three will use examples from three distinct areas of
international law, as well as examples from the implementation of
Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, to illustrate how the application of
neoclassical economics both constrains the ability of global
institutions and rules to support SSF and agricultural biodiversity, and
also enables the spread of industrialized agriculture to the detriment of
human and planetary health.30 Finally, Section Four will discuss how
our existing orientation can be changed: leveraging new kinds of
alliances; asserting new views of how government can be a
28. See, e.g., KOOHAFKAN & ALTIERI, supra note 27, at 5–8 (noting the
importance of institutional support for biodiversity in farming and agricultural
heritage systems); MICHAEL T. LEWIS, NAVIGATING SYSTEM TRANSITION IN A
VOLATILE CENTURY 31–35 (2017) (stating that food sovereignty, decentralized
democratic food systems, and mobilizing against a system that is focused on profits
are the core values of La Via Campesina).
29. See infra Section II.
30. See infra Section III.
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constructive positive force in protecting SSF and agricultural
biodiversity, in recognition of their critical in the health, and
ultimately, survival of our people and planet.31

II. THE EFFECT OF MARKET SUPREMACY AND
THE DENIGRATION OF THE STATE
The prestige of market-thinking rose with the end of the Cold
War.32As philosopher Michael Sandel wrote in The Atlantic Monthly:
“The years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 were a heady time of
market faith and deregulation – an era of market triumphalism. The era
began in the early 1980s, when Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
proclaimed their conviction that markets, not government, held the key to
prosperity and freedom. And it continued into the 1990s with the marketfriendly liberalism of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, who moderated but
consolidated the faith that markets are the primary means for achieving the
public good.”33

Market triumphalism was paralleled by a “gradual dismantling of
the public sector as both a regulator and a provider of goods and
services.”34 As U.S. President Reagan said in his 1988 State of the
Union address: “My friends, some years ago, the Federal Government
declared war on poverty, and poverty won.”35 The United States and
parts of Europe, for example, saw a proliferation of for-profit schools,
hospitals and prisons.36 Even war was outsourced to private military
contractors.37 Sandel continues: “These uses of markets to allocate
health, education, public safety, national security, criminal justice,
environmental protection, recreation, procreation and other social
goods were for the most part unheard of 30 years ago. Today, we take

31. See infra Section IV.
32. See Michael J. Sandel, What Isn’t for Sale?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
2012,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/04/what-isnt-forsale/308902/.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. See Susan H. Bragdon, Reinvigorating the Public Sector: The Case of Food
Security, Small-Scale Farmers, Trade and Intellectual Property Rules, 59
DEVELOPMENT 280, 281 (2016).
35. See Transcript of Reagan’s State of the Union Message to Nation, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 1988), at A16.
36. Bragdon, Reinvigorating the Public Sector, supra note 35, at 281.
37. Id.
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them largely for granted.”38
Under names such as ‘Reinventing Government’ in the US and
‘New Public Management’ in Europe, government administrators are
encouraged to work within a market model, and even required to use
a “market solution where markets had never been.”39 By making
exchange between sellers and buyers the embodiment of economic
value, neoclassic economics removes the basis for the consideration
of government as a producer in its own right.40 Suddenly, the public
sector is reduced to “an arena for innumerable individual
exchanges.”41 This is accompanied by widespread privatization and
contracting out of public services.42
The reconceptualization of government in business terms has had
deleterious effects on public welfare.43 Yet, this re-orientation goes
further, casting the government as a villain in the operation of the
economy.44
What does this mean for food systems and particularly SSF and
agricultural biodiversity? Four things flow from the neoclassical
economic view of private industry, market supremacy, and a
dismantled and reoriented public sector, which, taken together, have a
38. Sandel, supra note 32, at 4.
39. See JAMES K. GALBRAITH, THE PREDATOR STATE: HOW CONSERVATIVES
ABANDONED THE FREE MARKET AND WHY LIBERALS SHOULD TOO xii (2009).
40. See Sekera, The Public Economy, supra note 11, at 37.
41. See HUGH STRETTON & LIONEL ORCHARD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE, PUBLIC CHOICE: THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE
CONTEMPORARY ATTACK ON GOVERNMENT 158 (1994) (comparing the way public
choice theorists try to understand the government to how economists traditionally
focused on allocation and exchange in economics to illustrate the common flaws in
both approaches).
42. See JUNE SEKERA, GLOB. DEV. & ENV’T INST. AT TUFTS UNIV.,
OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT – THE QUIET REVOLUTION: EXAMINING THE EXTENT
OF GOVERNMENT-BY-CORPORATE-CONTRACTOR 1–2 (2017) (describing how there
are two times more contract workers providing government goods and services than
federal workers, and how contractors receive about 40% of the federal budget’s
discretionary spending) [hereinafter SEKRA, OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT].
43. See James Midgley, Growth, Redistribution, and Wealth: Toward Social
Investment, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 3, 3–4 (1999) (explaining that the
reconceptualization of government in business terms leads to spending cuts in social
welfare programs).
44. See Sekera, The Public Economy, supra note 11, at 39–42 (claiming
“mainstream” economists describe public goods and collective action in terms of
“problems” that “prejudice students against government”).
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negative impact on SSF and agricultural biodiversity specifically, and
on the public interest in general:
1. Profit-seeking through markets in the absence of a vibrant
public sector emphasizes food as a commodity, and not as a human
right,45 and does not appropriately value and support SSF and
agricultural biodiversity;
2. Contrary to Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, seeking and creating
markets ignores relationships and complexity. Instead of addressing
the root causes of interconnected issues such as poverty and
malnutrition, complex systems are disaggregated into discrete issues
to be solved by distinct products or services developed through
market-mechanisms;46
3. Agribusiness grows in power and concentration affecting,
amongst other things, farmers’ livelihoods, choice and the source,
culturally sensitive access to markets, direction and focus of
innovation;47
4. The state is increasingly captured by private interests as
governments, both individually and collectively, increasingly meet the
needs of the wealthy few rather than of the majority, perverting the
public purpose of government and allowing private enrichment at
public expense.48
Private industry49 is understandably interested in making profits and
therefore seeks out an ability to pay and market-demand.50 Generally
45. See Clive Stannard, The Multilateral System of Access And Benefit Sharing:
Could It Have Been Constructed Another Way?, in CROP GENETIC RESOURCES AS A
GLOBAL COMMONS: CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GOVERNANCE 243,
252–53, 258 (Michael Halewood et al. eds., 2012) (stating that the focus on
monetary gain has been detrimental for developing countries in need of food).
46. See SEKERA, OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT, supra note 43, at 6.
47. See FAO, THE FUTURE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: TRENDS AND
CHALLENGES 108 (2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6583e.pdf (noting how farmers’
inability to use the same supermarket channels as agribusiness chains and
agribusiness’s reduced labor requirements lead to harm to farmers’ livelihoods).
48. See, e.g., id. at 108–109 (describing how low-income populations eat “empty
calorie” foods linked to diet-related diseases more frequently due to their inability
to afford the healthier foods that higher income populations consume).
49. The use of the term ‘private industry” rather than “private sector” is
purposeful and meant to distinguish large corporations and agribusiness from
private sector actors such as small-scale farmers.
50. See, e.g., Paul Chambers, Technology and the Profit Motive 117 J. ROYAL
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speaking, it does not focus on human need per se, or the overall public
interest.51 Instead, private industry production is usually oriented
toward the larger and more profitable markets, in order to achieve
economies of scale and higher profit.52 As the supremacy of market
ideology has taken hold and spread globally, food has been
increasingly treated as a commodity; access to affordable, nutritious
food as a basic human right becomes obscured.53
With the provision of food viewed as primarily a market
transaction, private industry focuses on the efficient production of a
commodity and optimizing all of the factors in the supply chain.54
Private food producers are unlikely to reflect an understanding of
the complexity and diversity of SSF physical and social environments.
Market actors fail to consider access to goods and services by those
most in need, nor do they focus on those most at risk, or on issues
surrounding inequality and social justice.55 Whether acting as a
promulgator of law and policy, or as a provider of goods and services,
government is intended to play this role in society.56
Private industry can be part of the calculation in delivering support
to SSF and agricultural biodiversity, but only in the context of small
and medium enterprises, and in local and regional markets, with a
robust, accountable public sector and regulatory bodies.57 Two
SOC. ARTS 188, 189–190 (1969) (arguing that a profit motive is needed to make
technological advances in the food industry).
51. See id. at 189 (claiming that to even say that profit does not matter is
hypocritical because in order to work for the sake of public interest, one must
provide good products, and when one provides good products, one makes a good
income, so that would be a factor in the majority of people’s motivation).
52. See id. at 189–90.
53. See Stannard, supra note 46, at 252–53, 258.
54. See FAO, supra note 48, at 108.
55. See Kenneth Iain Macdonald, The Devil is in the (Bio)diversity: Private
Sector “Engagement” and the Restructuring of Biodiversity Conversation, in
CAPITALISM AND CONSERVATION 46–48 (Dan Brockington & Rosaleen Duffy, eds.
2011) (describing how biodiversity conservation has been the instrument of
capitalism, among other political projects, rather than environmental agendas).
56. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, ¶¶ 41, 45 (Sept. 25, 2015).
57. See, e.g., Bhuwon Sthapit, Emerging Theory and Practice: Community Seed
Banks, Seed System Resilience and Food Security, in COMMUNITY SEED BANKS IN
NEPAL PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 16, 33 (Pitambar Shrestha et al. eds., 2012) (arguing
that a community seed bank, as opposed to individual to individual transactions,
fosters rules and regulations of local institutions and establishes legitimacy within a
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examples of how this might work include local procurement policies
to create incentives to protect agricultural biodiversity and human or
environmental health, or a public agency could facilitate and support
an identified public purpose (e.g., providing a network of community
seed banks).58
Market-based solutions are often tied to technological solutions,
where technologies are developed and disseminated to solve
problems, creating disaggregation.59 The technological and marketbased approaches in agriculture have historically had a linear approach
characterized by inputs and outputs, where farmers are customers or
clients, buying or being given seed and fertilizer.60 Newer versions of
the technology-fix/market-based-solution approach, such as those
presented by biotechnology, are part of this same framework, and
yield similar results.61 This approach presumes the underlying problem
is a technical one that therefore can be solved by a technical solution.62
Technology fixes generally ignore the social, political, and economic
forces underlying a food system that works for the majority of people,
and thus they harm planetary health as well.63 For example, the
technology-based effort to biofortify crops neither addresses what puts
diversified cropping systems at risk, nor does it address what is
community and with the government).
58. See id. (describing how a seed bank in Nepal promoted agricultural
biodiversity at an intersection of private and local sectors).
59. See J.W. Dellimore & J.H. Dellimore, Select Technological Issues in AgroIndustry, 28 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 54, 81–82 (1979).
60. See Carol Markwei et al., Summary for Decision Makers of the Sub-Saharan
Africa Report, in AGRICULTURE AT A CROSSROADS: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 61, 84
(2009), http://www.fao.org/3/i2230e/i2230e04.pdf (adding that farmers who do not
invest in technology typically must pay for expensive inputs yet produce poorly
made outputs, creating a weak business sector and limiting the farmers to strictly
local markets); see also DUNSTAN S.C. SPENCER ET AL., INTERACADEMY COUNCIL,
AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN PERSPECTIVE 19
(2004) (showing farmers’ reliance on the input-output system in most African
countries); Carl K. Eicher et al., Crop Biotechnology and the African Farmer, 31
FOOD POL’Y 504, 517, 523 (2006) (describing how old and well-established the
input-output market is in Africa, and how the seed and fertilizer input delivery
systems require improvement through technical pathways).
61. See Eicher et al., supra note 61, at 523.
62. See J. EDWARD TAYLOR & TRAVIS J. LYBBERT, ESSENTIALS OF
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 230–32 (2015) (explaining that there are several
constraints stopping poor farmers from adopting agricultural technology).
63. See FAO, supra note 48, at 39–41 (describing the significant impacts of
agricultural production on climate change).
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compromising the ability of farmers to produce a balanced diet. 64 In
fact, it ignores the risk of uniformity both to dietary diversity and the
resiliency of agricultural production systems.65 In this way, the focus
of the technology fix is narrowed to insufficient nutrients, and a
nutrient-enriched product is produced by the market, without regard
for the impacts of that production process.66 As described by Eric HoltGiménez in his book A Foodie’s Guide to Capitalism:
“When hidden hunger is reduced to a problem of micronutrient
deficiencies, addressing hunger serves a political and economic function.
First, it gives power and profit to whichever corporation provides the
micronutrients. Second, it masks the way the global food system has
destroyed traditional sources of nutrients and impoverished people’s
diets . . . It also allows governments and industry to depoliticize . . .
nutrient deficiencies by recasting them as technical problems to be solved
by technical solutions rather than structural measures like land reform,
promotion of agroecological approaches to farming, market reforms and
living wages.”67

Multinational firms dominate agricultural markets and corporate
concentration is growing:
“Consolidation across the agri-food industry has made farmers ever more
reliant on a handful of suppliers and buyers, further squeezing their incomes
and eroding their ability to choose what to grow, how to grow it and for
whom . . . .Increasing market concentration has also narrowed the scope of
innovation, reinforcing a focus on input traits and major crops promising
greater returns on investment . . . Furthermore, consolidation is driving the
reduction in seed and livestock genetic diversity, while amplifying the risk
of disease proliferation in increasingly centralized and homogenized
systems . . . Rather than putting food systems on a path to sustainability,
consolidation reinforces the logic of the industrial model.”68

64. See Sally Brooks, Philanthrocapitalism, ‘Pro-Poor’ Agricultural
Biotechnology and Development, in NEW PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
DEBATING THE CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY DISCOURSE 101, 105–07 (Behrooz
Morvaridi, ed. 2015) (calling a biofortification technique “generic,” “inherently
scalable,” and void of evidence of efficacy and environmental safety).
65. See id. at 106–07 (exploring the issue through the lens of Golden Rice).
66. See ERIC HOLT-GIMÉNEZ, A FOODIE’S GUIDE TO CAPITALISM 194 (2017)
(introducing the concept of Nutrionism and its pitfalls).
67. See id.
68. See INT’L PANEL OF EXPERTS ON SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYS., TOO BIG TO
FEED: EXPLORING THE IMPACTS OF MEGA-MERGERS, CONSOLIDATION AND
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There is no international anti-trust law or regime to address the scale
of, let alone break up, agricultural monopolies, and national
governments’ reluctance to enforce anti-trust (anti-competitive) law
illuminates the degree to which governments are controlled by
industry rather than governments regulating industry.69 Furthermore,
concentration of power and wealth in a small number of companies
strengthens those companies’ ability to shape the regulatory context in
which they operate in their favor, providing significant price-setting
power.70 Due to the large economies of scale that they are able to
achieve through lack of regulation and limited transparency into their
operations, monopolistic entities are easily able to crowd smaller
producers out of the market, negatively impacting SSF and producer
livelihoods.71
The different interests between the wealthy and the non-wealthy,
and the disproportionate power of the wealthy over national policy, is
well-documented in both the United States and in Europe.72 Nowhere
is this more evident than in the negotiation of trade agreements. 73
Large corporations are part of a process that allows corporate
“citizens” to view and weigh in on trade agreements as they are being

CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN THE AGRI-FOOD SECTOR 5, 77 (Chantal Clément &
Mick Jacobs eds., 2017) [hereinafter IPESFS].
69. See Jonathan B. Baker et al., Unlocking Anti-Trust Enforcement 127 YALE
L.J. 1916, 1916–19 (2018) (using the United States to illustrate the dangers of not
having anti-trust enforcement).
70. See SOPHIA MURPHY ET AL., OXFAM, CEREAL SECRETS: THE WORLD’S
LARGEST GRAIN TRADERS AND GLOBAL AGRICULTURE 11 (2012), https://wwwcdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-tradersagriculture-30082012-en_4.pdf, (adding that the immense size and price-setting
power of large companies makes entry for newcomers difficult).
71. See id.
72. See Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences of
Wealthy Americans, 11 SOC. POL’Y PERSP. 51, 68 (2013) (emphasizing that the
evidence supports the long-held belief that the wealthy disproportionately participate
in politics); see also Daron Acemoglu & James T. Robinson, Persistence of Power,
Elites, and Institutions, 98 AM. ECON. R. 267, 287 (2008) (describing how the
wealthy are more likely to invest their de facto political power in lobbying and
bribery due to their small numbers and large expected gains).
73. See generally Susan H. Bragdon et al., The Wrong Conversation About
Trump’s
Tariffs,
COMMON
DREAMS
(Dec.
22,
2018),
https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/12/22/wrong-conversation-abouttrumps-tariffs (summarizing how ordinary people have little influence on trade
policies while corporations are given a seat at the negotiating table).
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negotiated, while public interest organizations cannot.74 This influence
has allowed large corporations in multiple sectors to dominate global
markets and profit handsomely. As noted by Professor Wu, corporate
concentration and influence cast aside “the safeguards that . . . protect
democracy against a dangerous marriage of private and public
power.”75

III.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
A. THE BIODIVERSITY TREATIES

Technological advances in the 1970s led to an expansion of the
scope and breadth, and international cooperation in, the recognition of
plant-related intellectual property rights (IPR).76 The economic gain
was enjoyed primarily by private industry,77 and there was no
corresponding economic instrument to reward SSF and Indigenous
and Local Communities, who had been conserving and developing
genetic resources for thousands of years, and who provided the
foundation for innovation subsequently protected through IP.78
74. See id.
75. See Tim Wu, Opinion, Be Afraid of Economic ‘Bigness.’ Be Very Afraid,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
10,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/opinion/sunday/fascism-economymonopoly.html.
76. See
Overview:
The
TRIPS
Agreement,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ intel2_e.htm (last visited July 26,
2020) (providing an overview of the multilateral Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement); Fulya Batur & Tom
Dedeurwaerdere, The Use of Agrobiodiversity for Plant Improvement and the
Intellectual Property Paradigm: Institutional Fit and Legal Tools for Mass
Selection, Conventional and Molecular Plant Breeding, 10 LIFE SCI. SOC’Y &
POL’Y, at 6, 8 (2014) (providing an overview of the reduced intellectual property
right exemptions under the International Union for the Protection of New Plant
Varieties Convention and TRIPS).
77. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION
ON
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS,
58
(2002),
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf
(highlighting the fact that private sector investment in agricultural research has
increased while public investment has decreased).
78. See Batur & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 77, at 5–6 (describing the influence
of traditional mass selection activities and the dissemination of agricultural
knowledge throughout time on the genetic improvement of crops); COMM’N ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 7, 11–12 (highlighting the fact that,
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Adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the
Convention on Biological Diversity79 (CBD) responded by
establishing a parallel tool: contracts for access and benefit-sharing
(ABS).80 This tool was designed to allow “provider” countries—in
particular, the custodians and developers of agricultural resources—to
capture the economic value of the resources’ diversity.81 Article 15,
the ABS provision of the CBD, asserts a country’s national
sovereignty over its natural resources and hence its ability to regulate
access to genetic resources under its jurisdiction.82 The treaty article
uses terms such as “prior informed consent” and “mutually agreed
terms” that imply a bilateral negotiation between a user and a provider,
whereby contractual arrangements are made for access and benefitsharing.83
In practical effect, the CBD codified the creation of a market in
genetic resources.84 Reflecting neoclassical economics, governments
acting together effectively reduced their role in generating support for
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity by creating
“an arena for innumerable individual exchanges.”85
The bilateral negotiation, between a country of origin and one
despite the link between indigenous technological capacity and economic growth,
few U.S. patents were granted to applicants from developing countries).
79. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature Jun. 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD].
80. See id. art.15 (Access to Genetic Resources); SUSAN H. BRAGDON, QUAKER
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OVER
AGRICULTURAL
BIODIVERSITY
20
(2017),
https://quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/Evolution%20of%20Rights%20and%
20Responsibilities_1.pdf [hereinafter BRAGDON, EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS &
RESPONSIBILITIES].
81. See BRAGDON, EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 81,
at 20.
82. See CBD, supra note 80, art. 15(1) (“Recognizing the sovereign rights of
States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access to genetic
resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national
legislation.”).
83. See id. art. 15(4)(5); see also BRAGDON, EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS &
RESPONSIBILITIES supra note 81, at 20.
84. See BRAGDON, EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 81,
at 20.
85. See STRETTON & ORCHARD, supra note 42, at 158 (highlighting the fact that
economists and public choice theorists ignore both the persons making exchanges
and the goods they exchange).

2020] SMALL-SCALE FARMERS & AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY

17

applying the use of genetic resources, raised concerns regarding the
potential impact on agricultural biological diversity, in this case the
genetic resource component of agricultural biodiversity.86 The
concerns were two-fold:
1) Bilateral arrangements might inhibit the exchange of plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) when all
countries, developed and developing alike, are highly interdependent
for food security;87 and
2) Determining a resource’s country of origin as defined in the
CBD would be problematic because PGRFA have been moving
around the world throughout the history of agriculture, and the
heritage of new varieties is often unclear.88
The International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (IT) was negotiated in response to this development, with
one of the goals to establish a multilateral system of ABS (MLS). 89
Despite being a multilateral system, the basis for benefit-sharing of the
IT is the same as the CBD.90 Governments kept to the confines of a
contractual approach—this time through a standard material transfer
agreement—tying an act of access to the MLS to benefit-sharing
resulting from commercial use.91

86. See SUSAN H. BRAGDON, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, THE
FOUNDATION OF FOOD SECURITY: ENSURING SUPPORT TO SMALL-SCALE FARMERS
MANAGING
AGRICULTURAL
BIODIVERSITY
14
(2017),
http://quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/FS%20foundation_FINAL_
UPDATED.pdf [hereinafter BRAGDON, FOUNDATION OF FOOD SECURITY]
(describing how the representatives negotiating the CBD had little understanding of
PGRFA, raising questions regarding farmer’s rights and ex situ protections).
87. Id. at 15.
88. See id. at 14–15 (identifying the movement of PGRFA internationally and
throughout history as creating challenges for determining a resource’s country of
origin).
89. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, supra note 19; BRAGDON, FOUNDATION OF FOOD SECURITY, supra note
87, at 14–15 (explaining the theory of ABS benefiting providers of genetic resources
underlies both the IT and CBD).
90. See BRAGDON, FOUNDATION OF FOOD SECURITY, supra note 87, at 13
(highlighting that while the CBD applies to all types of non-human genetic
resources, it still has the same objectives as the IT).
91. See id. at 15 (describing the IT’s establishment of the benefit-sharing fund
and the distribution of benefits to organizations engaging in the sustainable use of
PGRFA and conservation).
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ABS, under the IT MLS, also has not generated monetary benefits.92
The IT’s Benefit-Sharing Fund (BSF) is part of an overall funding
strategy adopted in 2006 that seeks to attract financial resources from
all possible sources.93 The BSF’s purpose is to provide funding for the
on-farm conservation and development of crop genetic resources in
developing countries and to improve food security by helping
developing country farmers cope with climate change and other
threats to food production.94 The BSF is the only part of the funding
strategy under the direct control of its Governing Body; without
monetary benefits from the MLS, it is dependent on voluntary
contributions.95 Notably, as of 2018, no direct payments for access
from the MLS have been made.96 The Benefit-Sharing Fund has been
funded through voluntary contributions only.97 It distributed $20
million USD to 61 projects in 55 developing countries over three
project cycles.98 A fourth call for proposals is in in process and expects
to disburse $5 million USD.99 This is a long way from the five-year
goal of $160 million USD for the Benefit-Sharing Fund established in
2011.
92. See id. at 17 (describing the IT’s Benefit-Sharing Fund receiving its $22
million entirely through voluntary contributions and the Fund’s anticipated future
financial difficulties).
93. See The Funding Strategy, Subheading to Benefit-Sharing Fund, FAO,
http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/areas-of-work/benefit-sharing-fund/policyguidance/en/ (last visited June 17, 2020).
94. See FAO, BENEFIT-SHARING FUND: CROP DIVERSITY FOR FOOD SECURITY
1, 3, 5 (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-bb146e.pdf (providing an overview of the
purpose of the BSF).
95. See id. at 11 (highlighting the Governing Body’s control over the BSF and
the BSF’s dependence on voluntary contributions); FAO, The Funding Strategy for
the Implementation of the International Treaty, ¶ 2.1 (2017),
http://www.fao.org/3/I8698EN/i8698en.pdf, [hereinafter FAO, Funding Strategy].
96. See FAO, Rep. of the Eighth Session of the Governing Body on The BenefitSharing Fund 2018-219, at 2–3, 24, U.N. Doc. IT/GB-8/19/9.1/Inf.1 Rev.1 (2019),
http://www.fao.org/3/na914en/na914en.pdf, [hereinafter Item 9.1].
97. See FAO, Financial Statements 2018-2019 for the Core Administrative
Budget (Including Reserve Funds), as Well as Special Funds for Agreed Purpose,
Special Funds to Support the Participation of Developing Country Contracting
Parties and the Benefit-Sharing Fund, http://www.fao.org/3/na914en/na914en.pdf,
[hereinafter Financial Statements 2018-2019] (calculating that BSF funding
exclusively consisted of voluntary contributions and the interest accrued on those
voluntary contributions).
98. See Fourth Call for Proposals Under the Benefit-Sharing Fund Opens, FAO
(Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/news/news-detail/en/c/1073028/.
99. See id.
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Another part of the IT’s Funding Strategy is the Global Crop
Diversity Trust. Established in 2004, this Trust was designed to
bring together and secure gene banks that are tasked by the
international community withconserving this legacyfor humanity ex
situ.100 The Global Crop Diversity Trust is an independent
organization under international law.101 With the exception of
allowing the Governing Body of the IT to nominate four board
members and presenting an annual report of its activities to the
Governing Body, the Trust maintains full independence in
managing its operations and activities and in making decisions
relating to the raising and investment of funds, and all operations,
including decisions relating to the allocation of grants from the
Trust.102 Despite this autonomy, and because of its considerable
contribution to ex situ conservation, the Trust is recognized as an
essential element of the Funding Strategy of the IT in relation to the
ex situ conservation and availability of PGRFA.103
The Crop Trust established a Donor’s Council of public and private
donors to provide a forum to express their views on the Trust’s
activities and operations.104 For a government to be a member of the
Council it must pay at least $25,000 USD.105 A private donor must
contribute at least $250,000 USD for representation.106 Some of the
current Donor Council Members include Bayer, DuPont, Syngenta,
100. See Shakeel Bhatti, The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, in
DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS: PROCEEDINGS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 137, 140 (Paul F. Uhlir ed., 2011).
101. See
Our
Mission,
GLOB.
CROP
DIVERSITY
TR.,
https://www.croptrust.org/our- mission/ (last visited June 17, 2020) (providing an
overview of the Crop Trust mission and its focus on crop diversity); see also
Establishment, GLOB. CROP DIVERSITY TR., https://www.croptrust.org/aboutus/governance-policy/establishment/ (last visited June 17, 2020) (listing the earliest
signing or acceding of parties to the Establishment Agreement taking place in 2004).
102. See Governance & Policy, GLOB. CROP DIVERSITY TR.,
https://www.croptrust.org/about-us/governance-policy/ (last visited June 18, 2020).
103. See id. (detailing the overall organization and composition of the four organs
of the Crop Trust).
104. See id.; The Plant Treaty, GLOB. CROP DIVERSITY TR.,
https://www.croptrust.org/about-us/governance-policy/the-plant-treaty/ (last visited
June 18, 2020).
105. The
Donor’s
Council,
GLOB.
CROP
DIVERSITY
TR.,
https://www.croptrust.org/about-us/governance-policy/donors-council/ (last visited
June 18, 2020) (describing the purpose and composition of the Donor’s Council).
106. See id.
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Unilever, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.107
The mission and the objectives of the Global Trust are laudable. Yet
it is notable that when it comes to conserving agricultural biodiversity
ex situ, wealthier governments and private industry did not turn to
market mechanisms, but instead built a self-sustaining, permanent
Global Crop Diversity Endowment Fund of $850 million USD.108
Furthermore, unlike the functioning of the MLS, which is accountable
to the governments who are parties to the IT, governance of Crop Trust
is not accountable to the parties, and has a cost of entry to
representation of its Donor Council that is out of reach for many
developing countries, small and medium private industry, social
movements and organizations representing the interests of SSF.109 The
sad result is that in the absence of direct payments from the MLS, the
Benefit-Sharing Fund has struggled to attract voluntary contributions
to support farmers in developing countries while the Global Trust has
fared much better.110 As of 2018, $440 million USD has been pledged
to the Trust.111
It is understandable why the Crop Trust chose to structure its
relationship with the IT as it did. First, since 2004, Working Groups
under IT have been discussing how to make the MLS function better,
and while some progress has been made, no agreement has been
reached.112 One could argue that the intergovernmental process
107. See
Our
Donors,
GLOB.
CROP
DIVERSITY
TR.,
https://www.croptrust.org/about-us/donors/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) (listing
Crop Trust’s donors).
108. See The Endowment Fund, GLOB. CROP DIVERSITY TR.,
https://www.croptrust.org/our-mission/crop-diversity-endowment-fund/
(last
visited June 18, 2020) (explaining goals and mission of the Fund).
109. See Governance & Policy, supra note 103 (laying out leadership structure of
Crop Trust and its status as an independent organization under international law).
110. Compare Financial Statements 2018-2019, supra note 98 (showing lower
voluntary contributions to Benefit-Sharing Fund), with SIR PETER CRANE, Chair of
Executive Board, GLOB. CROP DIVERSITY TR., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE
YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2019 4, 12–13 (2020), https://cdn.croptrust.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/CropTrust_FinancialStatement_2019.pdf (demonstrating
higher contributions for Global Crop Diversity Fund).
111. See Our Donors, supra note 108.
112. See FAO, Rep. of the Eight Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working
Grp. to Enhance the Functioning of the Multilateral Sys., ¶¶ 9–12, U.N. Doc.
IT/OWG-EFMLS-8/18/Report (2018) [hereinafter Rep. of the Ad Hoc Working
Group] (laying out the Working Group’s goal of adapting coverage of Multilateral
Systems); see also FAO, Development of the Funding Strategy for the International
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intended to improve the MLS is not working, perhaps going as far as
to say the process is broken.113 Second, the “endowment approach” of
the Crop Trust is an implicit acknowledgment that the financial
resources required to fund conservation exceed potential benefit flows
from market transactions related to the commercialization of these
resources.114
The inability of governments to collectively find ways to mobilize
support for the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA and
recognition of Farmer’s Rights under International Undertaking,115 the
non-binding predecessor to the IT, particularly in support of the needs
of developing countries, reflects the neoclassic economic dismissal of
the non-market public economy of government.116 In effect, this results
in a collective hollowing out of government’s roles.117 The
neoclassical mindset guided governments negotiating the IT to go
down the more limited, contractual road paved by the CBD. 118 As
noted by Clive Stannard:
“This direction inevitably led to a single-minded focus on benefit sharing,
in general, to the detriment of international arrangements for the sound
management of the genetic resources themselves, and to a specific focus on
the mandatory sharing of monetary benefits derived from commercial use
which became the almost exclusive topic of the negotiations and
culminated in the negotiation of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement

Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources For Food and Agriculture, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
CGRFA/IC/OWG-1/05/7 (2005) [hereinafter Development of the Funding Strategy]
(establishing the Multilateral System as a priority for the Working Group).
113. See BRAGDON, FOUNDATION OF FOOD SECURITY, supra note 87, at 22
(arguing that MLS has failed to generate benefits).
114. See The Endowment Fund, supra note 109 (explaining that all support for
the Fund comes directly from investment income earned).
115. See id. (describing the Fund’s reliance on private donors and market forces);
see also BRAGDON, FOUNDATION OF FOOD SECURITY, supra note 87, at 11–13
(stating the limited success governments have had at creating coherence on use of
PGRFA).
116. See Sekera, The Public Economy, supra note 11, at 37 (explaining the
economic theory of the government as a non-producer).
117. See John D. Donahue, Review, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 690, 690–
91 (2008) (reviewing DAVID G. FREDERICKSON AND H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON,
MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE HOLLOW STATE (2006)) (describing how
measurements of productivity and performance management can be used to cut
down government).
118. See Stannard, supra note 46, at 251–52 (explaining how concerns about
public goods and collections was seen as problematic in the context of the CBD).
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(SMTA). . . .”119

The governing body established by the Treaty has been examining
the functioning of the MLS through different working groups since
2004.120 The current incarnation of the governing body is called the
Ad-Hoc Open-ended Working Group to Enhance the Functioning of
the MLS (MLS Group).121 During the first meeting of the MLS Group
in Geneva in December 2014, consultants reported a “mismatch”
between the projections and expectations for the IT BSF.122 The MLS
Group continues to discuss ways to make the system work to generate
robust and predictable flow of monetary benefits.123 Without
detracting from the non-monetary benefits—including facilitated
access to PGRFA in the MLS—there is consensus on the concept of a
subscription service.124
The subscription service generally concerns access to both genetic
resources and sequence data, and sharing of related monetary
benefits.125 Commercial users or governments representing
119. Id. at 252.
120. See, e.g., FAO, Rep. of Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Grp. to Enhance the
Functioning of the Multilateral Sys. on Background on the Work Undertaken by the
Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on the Funding Strategy, and Its Further Development,
First Meeting, at 1, U.N. Doc. IT/OWG-EFMLS-1/14/3 (2014) [hereinafter
Background on the Work] (recalling the Ad Hoc Working Group’s examination of
the MLS); see also Development of the Funding Strategy, supra note 113, at 1–3
(reviewing the Open-Ended Funding Strategy Working Group’s examination of the
MLS).
121. See Background on the Work, supra note 121, at 1.
122. See FAO, Rep. of Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Grp. to Enhance the
Functioning of the Multilateral Sys. on Its Synoptic Study 1: Estimating Income to
Be Expected From Possible Changes in the Provisions Governing the Functioning
of the Multilateral Sys., at 6–9, U.N. Doc. IT/OWG-EFMLS-2/14/3 (2014)
[hereinafter Synoptic Study 1] (exploring the difference between theoretical
potential income, and expected income under real world circumstances).
123. See FAO, Interim Rep. of Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Grp. to Enhance
the Functioning of the Multilateral Sys. on Its Ninth Meeting, at 16, U.N. Doc.
IT/OWG-EFMLS-9/19/Interim Report (2019) [hereinafter Interim Report]
(discussing the growth plan for the MLS).
124. See FAO, Rep. of Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on the Funding Strategy and
Resource Mobilization on its Eleventh Meeting, Annex 2: Operations Manual:
Benefit-Sharing Fund, at 5, U.N. Doc. IT/GB-8/ACFSRM-11/19/2 Add.2 (2019)
[hereinafter Annex 2] (the Governing Body finalized a negotiation process to
enhance the functioning of the Multilateral System, with the subscription system a
“key component” of the enhancement to the Multilateral System).
125. See FAO, Commentary of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Grp. to
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associations of commercial users would commit to making annual
payments to the Benefit-Sharing Fund, based on their annual seed
sales and for a fixed period of time.126 During that period, they would
have facilitated access to the genetic resources in the MLS and to
genetic sequence data.127 Because the rate of payment would be based
on seed sales, the need to track the use of materials or sequence data
in the creation of new products is eliminated.128 Alternative sources of
PGRFA outside the MLS as well as emerging technologies may
present further challenges generating monetary benefits through the
MLS.129
As a limited transactional approach—an exchange between users
and providers predicated on commercial value being shared—it is not
surprising that ABS fails to provide sufficient monetary benefits to
support both the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, and other actors, including farmers, conserving, using and
maintaining these resources on-farm and in situ.130 As reported by
Manuel Ruiz in his review of 25 years of experience with ABS, despite
tens of millions of dollars spent on capacity-building, awarenessraising, and legal and policy research through ‘innumerable projects
and initiatives,’131 there have been few measurable monetary
benefits.132 Furthermore, Ruiz notes that benefits for the conservation
Enhance the Functioning of the Multilateral Sys. on Structural Elements for the
Development of a Subscription Model/System, at 1, U.N. Doc. IT/OWG-EFMLS4/14/4 (2015) [hereinafter Commentary of Ad Hoc] (outlining the Subscription
Model).
126. See Michael Halewood et al., Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture Opportunities and Challenges Emerging from the Science and
Information Technology Revolution, 217 NEW PHYTOLOGIST 1407, 1417 (2018).
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See D. H. Augenstein, The Crisis of International Human Rights Law in the
Global Market Economy, 44 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 58 (2013) (describing how
increasingly globalized economies create new challenges for a Multilateral System).
130. See Manuel Ruiz Muller, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing
25 Years On: Progress and Challenges, at 4–5, ICTSD (2018) (explaining the
limited monetary benefits that can be offered by the existing framework of a system
like ABS).
131. See id. at 1; see also Access and Benefit Sharing, GLOB. ENVTL. FACILITY,
https://www.thegef.org/topics/access-and-benefit-sharing (last visited June 19,
2020) (describing over $60 million in activities and capacity building projects from
the ABS).
132. See id.
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of biodiversity are even less evident.133 Insightfully, Ruiz observes the
abbreviation of ABS from “access to genetic resources and fair and
equitable benefit-sharing to “access and benefit- sharing”
marginalized regard for equity and fairness in discourse on ABS.134
This diminished regard for the role and capacity of government, and
misplaced faith in the role of private industry to provide support for
agricultural biodiversity and its custodians, has led to undue focus and
resources spent on this inherently limited approach.135 An international
review of the functioning of ABS in practice found that despite a
multibillion- dollar industry,136 there are few bioprospecting initiatives
with commercial intent, and little monetary benefit accumulated.137
Even where benefits have accrued, the question remains whether they
are “fair and equitable” under a bilateral system given the asymmetries
in negotiating power.138

B. TRADE AND IPR
Trade and IP rules have exerted substantial influence on the
evolution of the modern food system, impacting the type, availability
and affordability of food around the world.139 These policy and legal
frameworks are therefore not just about trade or IPR; they are about
food systems.140
There are significant parallels between the evolution of multilateral
trade rules and IPR regimes as they relate to agriculture and food
133. See id.
134. See id. at n.1.
135. See Florian Rabitz, Access Without Benefit-Sharing: Design, Effectiveness
and Reform of the FAO Seed Treaty, 11 INT’L J. COMMONS 621, 623–25 (2017)
(laying out how feedback loop of ABS can lead to limited benefits on biodiversity).
136. See SARAH LAIRD & RACHEL WYNBERG, ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING IN
A T IME OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MARKET CHANGE: ESSENTIAL
LESSONS FOR POLICY–MAKERS 4 (2017).
137. See CHRISTIAN PRIP & KRISTIN ROSENDAL, PBL NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT
AGENCY, ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND BENEFIT-SHARING FROM THEIR USE
(ABS) – STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND RESEARCH GAPS viii (2015).
138. See DANIEL F. ROBINSON, BIODIVERSITY, ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING:
GLOBAL CASE STUDIES 31–32 (2015).
139. See Corinna Hawkes, Uneven Dietary Development: Linking the Policies
and Processes of Globalization with the Nutrition Transition, Obesity and DietRelated Chronic Diseases, GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, at 3–4 (2006) (arguing that
liberalization of the agricultural market has greatly shifted food sources).
140. See Bragdon, Reinvigorating the Public Sector, supra note 35, at 289.
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systems.141 Established in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
subjected agriculture to multilateral trading rules for the first time
through its Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).142 Similarly, the WTO’s
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS),
signed in 1994 and adopted in 2001, was the first time intellectual
property was brought within the framework of global trade rules.143
The long-term objective of the AoA is to “establish a fair and
market-oriented agricultural trading system.”144 The underlying
premise of this approach is that removing state support and protection
for agricultural production is the best way to achieve food security in
the long term.145 TRIPS sets out minimum standards for intellectual
property that all WTO State Members must incorporate into their
national laws.146 TRIPS embodies what, at the time of its signing, was
a relatively novel and counter-intuitive notion that trade restrictions—
such as embargos on ‘counterfeit’ goods that imitate copy-righted or
trademarked product—are required to promote trade liberalization.147
The arguments for trade liberalization and stronger and harmonized
IPR are rooted in a broader debate about the proper relationship
between the state and the market.148 Advocates for trade liberalization
141. See MERCEDES CAMPI & MARCO DUENAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 2 (2014)
(explaining historic connection between industries that use plants and grains and
multilateral trade rules).
142. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
433, 440 (2002).
143. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (providing
background on TRIPS); Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited
June 19, 2020) (describing the origin of intellectual property rules in the multilateral
trading system).
144. Gonzalez, supra note 143, at 459–60.
145. See id. at 469–73 (describing the benefits of four different types of foodrelated entitlements that could be the basis of government programs aimed at
improving food security for vulnerable populations: production-based, labor-based,
trade-based, and transfer-based entitlements).
146. See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 144.
147. Susan Bragdon & David Downes, Recent Policy Trends and Developments
Related to the Conservation, Use and Development of Genetic Resources, in ISSUES
IN GENETIC RESOURCES NO. 7, at 9 (1998).
148. See Anne Orford, Food Security, Free Trade, and the Battle for the State, 11
J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1, 64–65 (2015) (describing the roughly two-hundred-year
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as the best means to ensure food security espouse a belief in a form of
governance that allows the maximum freedom for the laws of the
market to unfold.149 Anne Orford notes: “The production of food and
the relation of this production to land and labour are at the heart of
politics, and yet the conscious attempt to institute democratic control
over these features of social life is made to seem illegitimate—a
barrier to trade, protectionist.”150
Ironically, as former developing countries, nearly all of today’s
industrialized countries used the protectionist tools currently denied
by trade rules to developing countries.151 Industrialized countries’
approach to trade and IPR effectively denies developing countries the
very flexibility they used in the course of their own economic
development when they established a system of intellectual property
rules or support to agricultural production.152 Many have questioned
whether industrialized nations would have been able to reach their
current stage of development if they did not have the flexibility they
are trying to deny developing nations today.153 The WTO agreements
were the first step in an ambitious approach to not just diminish the
role of the state, but also to remake the role, with its primary focus on
regulation in support of market interests.154
There is abundant literature on the relationship amongst trade, IP,
history of legal debates concerning appropriate limitations to state power on market
forces).
149. See id. at 4 (noting that this “maximum freedom” is an essential part of the
idealized model for a “free trade state”).
150. Id. at 24.
151. CHANG, supra note 10, at 61.
152. See Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development: Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 287, 291
(2001) (noting that Switzerland did not have a patent law until 1907 and the
Netherlands abolished its 1817 patent law in 1869, on the ground that patents were
politically-created monopolies inconsistent with its free-market principles and did
not introduce a patent law again until 1912).
153. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER 19 (2002) (describing
what Chang views as a hypocritical policy stance wherein developed, industrialized
nations advocate trade and technology policies for developing nations that are
diametrically opposed to policies the developed nations themselves used during their
industrial ages).
154. See id. at 15 (describing the “Neo-Liberal policy reform” stances employed
by most developing nations); Orford, supra note 149, at 55 (noting the ambitions
toward changing state interactions in the global market system that resulted from the
WTO negotiations).

2020] SMALL-SCALE FARMERS & AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY

27

and food and nutrition security,155 some with explicit or implicit
reference to SSF and agricultural biodiversity.156 This Article will
155. See, e.g., D. Ravi Kanth, Major North Countries Targeting South over
Agriculture,
THIRD
WORLD
NETWORK
(Mar.
13,
2019),
https://www.twn.my/title2/susagri/2019/sa748.htm. (describing the opposing trade
interests and approaches between developing nations, like the United States and
Australia, and developing nations, naming China and India prominently in the
dispute); ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 2: WHICH POLICIES FOR
TRADE AND MARKETS? (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. ed., 2008),
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/Achieving%20Sustainable%20
Development%20Goal%202.pdf (advocating for reforms to global trade policies in
order to reform food systems with an emphasis on equity and effectiveness); D. Ravi
Kanth, China-India Renew Battle to End US-EU Agri-Support Policies, THIRD
WORLD
NETWORK
(July
9,
2018),
https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2018/ti180707.htm, (covering the negotiations
between the WTO and China and India regarding the elimination of “trade-distorting
domestic support” from developed nations); Alison Slade, The Objectives and
Principles of the WTO TRIPS Agreement: A Detailed Anatomy, 53 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 948, 950 (2016) (opining on the novelty of identifying objectives and principles
behind an international IP treaty in the preamble section of the TRIPS Agreement);
Graham K. MacDonald et al., Rethinking Agricultural Trade Relationships in an Era
of Globalization, 65 BIOSCIENCE 275, 275 (2015) (exploring the impacts of
globalization in agricultural trade in relation to import-export imbalances and
environmental impacts); OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD 6 (2009),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/191691/20130715ATT69800ENoriginal.pdf (explaining the interaction between the WTO’s Agreements and the
obligations imposed upon the WTO’s members to obey certain regulations under
international law with respect to the right to obtain enough food for survival
purposes); Gregory D. Graff et al., The Public–Private Structure of Intellectual
Property Ownership in Agricultural Biotechnology, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
989, 989 (2003) (suggesting that international collaborative models for IP protection
and management in the public sector may be beneficial on a global scale). See
generally Leland L. Glenna et al., Intellectual Property, Scientific Independence,
and the Efficacy and Environmental Impacts of Genetically Engineered Crops, 80
RURAL SOCIOLOGY 147, 147 (2015) (explaining the impacts of neoliberalism on IP
law, scientific research, and environmental and agricultural sustainability and
reform).
156. See, e.g., Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food),
Interim Rep. on Seed Policies and the Right to Food: Enhancing Agrobiodiversity
and Encouraging Innovation, ¶¶ 24–25, U.N. Doc. A/64/170 (July 23, 2009) (noting
that the “green revolution” model of agricultural development involves providing
“small-scale farmers” with access to biodiverse crop seeds and the challenges that
states face in employing this model in such a way that economically benefits smallscale farmers and improves global food security); BRAGDON, FOUNDATION OF FOOD
SECURITY, supra note 87, at 6–7 (explaining the history of “the evolution of rights
and responsibilities over agricultural biodiversity at the international level” going
back to the Neolithic period, but with particular emphasis on more modern
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instead analyze both the theory and practice of how trade and IP rules
affect SSF and the sustainable production of healthy, diverse diets.
The alarming trends in hunger, malnutrition, and obesity make clear
that the world is not trading its way to better food and nutrition security
developments and the impact of technology on how the global community perceives
these discussions); Bragdon, Reinvigorating the Public Sector, supra note 35, at
280–81 (concluding that “trade liberalization and globally harmonized IPRs are
insufficient means for ensuring global food security,” in particular for “small-scale
farmers (SSF)”); SUSAN H. BRAGDON & CHELSEA SMITH, QUAKER UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE,
SMALL-SCALE FARMER INNOVATION
1 (2015),
https://quno.org/sites/default/files/timeline/files/2016/SSF%20Innovation%20WE
B.pdf (discussing the uniqueness of SSF (small-scale farmer) innovation systems);
Innovation and Access to Knowledge Programme Team, Towards a More Coherent
International Legal System on Farmers’ Rights: The Relationship of the FAO
ITPGRFA, UPOV and WIPO, 17 SOUTH CTR. POL’Y BRIEF, Mar. 2015,
https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PB17_More-CoherentInternational-Legal-System-on-Farmers%E2%80%99-Rights_EN.pdf (exploring
the interrelatedness of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants and the World Intellectual Property Organization, particularly as pertains to
Farmers’ Rights and agricultural biodiversity); CARLOS M. CORREA, QUAKER
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, TRIPS-RELATED PATENT FLEXIBILITIES AND FOOD
SECURITY: OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES POLICY GUIDE 2 (2012),
https://quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/ENGLISH_TRIPSRelated%20Patent%20Flexibilities%20and%20Food%20Security_CORREA.pdf
(uncovering a pressing need for “genetic variability” in agricultural production in
order to bolster global food security); Tung-Yi Kho, Intellectual Property Rights
and the North-South Contest for Agricultural Germplasm: A Historical Perspective,
1 AGRARIAN SOUTH: J. POL. ECON. 255, 256 (2012) (describing intellectual property
ownership developments in “agricultural seed and germplasm” and its impact on
agricultural biodiversity); KARLA D. MAASS WOLFENSON, COPING WITH THE FOOD
AND AGRICULTURE CHALLENGE: SMALLHOLDERS’ AGENDA. PREPARATIONS AND
OUTCOMES OF THE 2012 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (RIO+20) 2 (2013), http://www.fao.org/3/a-ar363e.pdf (suggesting
that promoting the well-fare of small-scale farmers will solve the global
environmental and social problems in relation to ecologically sustainable systems);
Rome, Italy, FAO, http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=ITA, (last
visited June 10, 2020) (Italy’s FAO “Country Profile” notes Italy’s commitment to
support small-scale farmers within its borders); TIINA HUVIO ET AL., SMALL-SCALE
FARMERS IN LIBERALISED TRADE ENVIRONMENT 15 (Tiina Huvio et al. eds., 2005)
(suggesting that trade liberalization, as it pertains to small-scale farmers, involves
the integration of “agricultural productivity, hunger, and poverty” into the calculus);
Peter Rosset, The Multiple Functions and Benefits of Small Farm Agriculture in the
Context of Global Trade Negotiations 43 DEVELOPMENT 77, 77–78, 81–82 (2000)
(arguing that trade liberalization and the Agreement on Agriculture currently under
negotiations at the WTO could “severely undercut the remaining viability of small
farm production”).
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for all.157 This begs the question: “Is the problem with the assumptions
underlying the free-market philosophy as applied to agricultural trade,
or is it an issue with the rules themselves, including how they are
made, interpreted and implemented?”
Jennifer Clapp, a leading political economist, provides a thorough
analysis of the dominant neoclassical arguments in the light of food
security concerns.158 The first premise of trade liberalization identified
is the theory of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage posits
that a country should produce what is in its comparative advantage to
produce, and trade for what it is not able to efficiently produce.159 For
comparative advantage to work in practice, two other presumptions
must hold: (1) that the market is competitive and, (2) that there is a
level playing field amongst participants in the system.160
The theory of comparative advantage says nothing about nutrition
and dietary diversity as a key component of food security, and hence
does not incorporate the effect on SSF and agricultural biodiversity.161
Rather, it equates production and sufficient calories with food
security.162 Application of comparative advantage pushes countries
157. See Sarah E. Clark et al., Exporting Obesity: US Farm and Trade Policy and
the Transformation of the Mexican Consumer Food Environment, 18 INT’L J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 53, 53 (2012) (describing obesity as “an
epidemic” in countries like the United States and its trade partners); W. Snowdon &
A.M. Thow, Trade Policy and Obesity Prevention: Challenges and Innovation in
the Pacific Islands, 14 OBESITY REVS. 150, 150 (2013) (suggesting that current trade
policies and agreements may contribute to an “obesogenic food environment” and
discussing the impacts of this reality on the Pacific Islands’ food supply and trade
possibilities).
158. See JENNIFER CLAPP, UNITED NATIONS, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FOOD
SECURITY:
EXAMINING
THE
LINKAGES
6
(2014),
http://quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/QUNO_Food%20Security_Clapp.pdf
(suggesting that there are “many caveats” to the “dominant neoclassical economic
arguments for agricultural trade” that need to be discussed in relation to concerns
about food security, that dominant trade theories use “an outdated notion of food
security” that could stand a “more nuanced” approach, and that “trade theory and
policy tends to prioritize efficiency” rather than social goals).
159. See id. at 7 (noting that “the theory of comparative advantage” is one of three
components to the neoclassical trade theory, with the other two components noting
a “moral imperative to distribute food” from regions of abundance to regions with a
deficit as well as “dangerous risks to food security associated with restricting trade
in food.”).
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id.
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into product specialization.163
Product specialization is problematic on multiple levels when it
comes to SSF and the production of diverse, nutrient-dense crops.164
First, it creates a bias toward cash crops and non-edibles, such as coffee
or horticultural products, for export over production for domestic food
markets.165 Second, product specialization incentivizes countries to
rely on international trade to meet domestic food needs, resulting in
rising import dependence and declining local production.166 A net food
importing country, particularly a developing country, is vulnerable to
price spikes or shortages due to unforeseen weather events, pests, and
diseases.167 Third, product specialization can cause an irreversible loss
of diversity and SSF knowledge.168 Generally, once a country
specializes in its production of goods, it has little choice but to trade
because adjustment back to a more diverse economy is difficult and
time-consuming.169 Even if the seeds, knowledge, and fertile land were
still available, it would take a season to produce a crop.170
Application of competitive advantage is antithetical to climate
resilience and the diversified farming systems that are the foundation
for healthy diets. The negative impacts are further exacerbated by the
influence of highly concentrated agribusiness, and the power
disparities within and between countries in the making and
163. See Peter K. Schott, Across-Product Versus Within-Product Specialization
in International Trade, 119 Q.J. ECON. 647, 648 (2004) (illustrating comparative
advantage pushing countries to specialize “in unique subsets of goods” by discussing
the Hecksher-Ohlin factor proportions framework’s assertion that the Philippines
specialized in labor-intensive product production whereas Japan specialized in
capital-intensive product production because of unique abundances in those two
countries).
164. See Jeffrey D. Michler & Anna L. Josephson, To Specialize or Diversify:
Agricultural Diversity and Poverty Dynamics in Ethiopia, 91 WORLD DEV. 214, 222
(2017) (suggesting that “agricultural diversification, not specialization,” could
reduce poverty levels).
165. See id. at 214 (noting that product specialization “will always be profit
maximizing.”).
166. See CLAPP, supra note 159, at 21–22 (noting that once countries specialize
in the production of specific commodities it often too difficult to re-diversify the
domestic agricultural economy, forcing reliance on trade).
167. See NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NICR 2013-05, NATURAL RESOURCES
IN 2020, 2030, AND 2040: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013).
168. See Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 14, at 1279.
169. See Herman E. Daly, The Perils of Free Trade, 269 SCI. AM. 50, 51 (1993).
170. Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 14, at 1279.
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implementation of the rules. Under this influence, agribusiness’s
concentration led to a ‘product specialization’ characterized by the
spread of high-input agricultural methods at the expense of diversified
and more environmentally-sustainable low-input systems.171 Without
improvement in local agriculture, many countries became completely
dependent upon food imports.172 Furthermore, as will be discussed
below, comparative advantage is a fiction in a system of rules that
codify substantial imbalances in agricultural subsidies.173
Despite years of continuing negotiations, the AoA174 and regional
trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), have not levelled the playing field between grossly
imbalanced levels of agricultural subsidies. Instead, these agreements
have opened up domestic markets to products from countries with
heavily-subsidized agricultural sectors.175 Because of their artificially
low prices, foreign subsidized products undercut the ability of
domestic producers to compete in their own markets.176 Under
NAFTA, trade liberalization caused the unemployment of an estimated
two million Mexican maize farmers and the replacement of diverse
farming systems with systems supporting processed foods.177 NAFTA
triggered an immediate surge of direct investment from the United
States into Mexico’s food processing industry.178 Between 1999 and
171. Id. at 1278.
172. See Martin Khor, THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON AGRICULTURE
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE EXPERIENCE OF GHANA (2008); see also JENNIFER
CLAPP, HUNGER IN THE BALANCE: THE NEW POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID
38 (2012) (noting that imports, including food aid, can change local diets and create
long-term dependencies on imported commodities).
173. See Chris Smaje, Comparative Disadvantage, SMALL FARM FUTURE (July
11, 2018), https://smallfarmfuture.org.uk/2018/07/comparative-disadvantage/
(suggesting that the theory of comparative advantage is not applicable to today’s
global economy).
174. Agreement on Agriculture art. 20, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 422, 422–23.
175. See Gonzalez, supra note 143, at 440 (noting that the Agreement on
Agriculture is the first agreement since 1947 that agriculture commodities have been
subject to multilateral trading rules).
176. Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 14, at 1280.
177. See A.P. Thirlwall, The Rhetoric and Reality of Trade Liberalization in
Developing Countries, 3 RIVISTA ITALINA DELGI ECONOMISTI 3, 16–17 (2014).
178. See Ramon Vera Herrera, The Global South Has Free Trade to Thank for Its
Obesity and Diabetes Epidemic, GUARDIAN (April 6, 2015, 10:06 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/06/global-south-has-free-
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2004, three-quarters of the country’s foreign investment in Mexico
went into the production of processed foods, sales of which went up
by 5 to 10 percent per year.179 After visiting Mexico in 2012, Olivier
de Shutter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, reported
that “[t]he overweight and obesity emergency that Mexico is facing
could have been avoided, or largely mitigated, if the health concerns
linked to shifting diets had been integrated into the design of the
country’s trade policies.”180
The peril of relying on comparative advantage was revealed in the
food crisis of 2007 to 2008, and in India and Mozambique in 2010
when world food prices increased dramatically and caused social
unrest in both developed and developing countries.181 During the
summer of 2007, 29 countries cut back on food exports to ensure their
populations had enough to eat.182 Several countries in South Asia had
limited or banned exports of rice. In other countries, exports of wheat
and even sunflower seeds had been restricted.183 The effects of social
unrest, as millions fell into poverty, proved to be lasting and
compounded into more dangerous work and less nutritious diets for
those affected.184
In theory, IP systems strike a balance between providing incentives
to innovators and to the wider public interest, by making useful
products available to society.185 In practice, IP systems protecting
plants, genetic information, and biological processes reflect the
economic structure and concerns of agriculture, and agribusiness, in
trade-to-thank-obesity-diabetes-epidemic.
179. See id.
180. See Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. on
Mission to Mexico, ¶ 11 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.2 (July 23, 2009).
181. See Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 14, at 1279.
182. Keith Bradsher & Andrew Martin, Food Crisis Deepens as Countries
Restrict
Exports,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
30,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/business/worldbusiness/30iht-trade.
4.14106348.html.
183. See, e.g., David Montero, Asia Limits Rice Exports and as Prices and
Uncertainty
Rise,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Apr.
22,
2008),
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2008/0422/p12s01-woap.html.
184. See, e.g., Mark Hughes, Global Food Crisis, INFOPLEASE (Feb. 11, 2017),
https://www.infoplease.com/math-science/earth-environment/global-food-crisis.
185. See PATTA SCOTT-VILLIERS ET AL., PRECARIOUS LIVES: FOOD, WORK AND
CARE AFTER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS 7 (2016) (telling the stories of those affected
by the global food crisis).
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industrialized countries.186 The adoption of TRIPS and the revision of
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) in 1991
expanded the global scope of the recognition of plant-related IP which
was occurring in industrialized countries.187 Two questions emerge
concerning plant related IP systems as tools of the market: do they
strike a balance between innovators and the wider public interest in
food and nutrition security; and can they simultaneously support the
economic interests they were created to bolster, and the interests of
SSF and agricultural biodiversity?188
Expansion of the individual rights component of IP policy and a
contraction of focus on broader social good have characterized IP
systems over the last forty years.189 This trend is demonstrated in both
plant-related patents as well as plant variety protection laws,190 as seen
in the evolution of UPOV.191
186. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM 36–38 (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter SENATE ECONOMIC REVIEW]
(noting that the patent system stimulates talents and the development of technology);
What is Intellectual Property?, WIPO (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.wipo.int/aboutip/en/.
187. See RAMESH CHANDRA, ISSUES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 32
(2004) (providing an overview of the historical development of intellectual property
as it relates to living things, including agriculture).
188. See
TRIPS
and
Public
Health,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharmpatent_e.htm
(background
regarding compulsory licenses for medicines as an amendment to the TRIPS
agreement); see also WIPO, Introduction to Plant Variety Protection Under the
UPOV Convention, ¶16, WIPO/IP/BIS/GE/03/11 (2003) [hereinafter WIPO
Introduction to UPOV] (sharing an overview of the UPOV convention and the
protections it provides for plant breeding and development).
189. See SENATE ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 187, at 36 (asking the questions
rhetorically and providing a response); Hannu Wager, Biodiversity, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore: Work on Related IP Matters in the WTO, 3
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 219 (2008) (focusing on the relationship
between the TRIPS agreement and genetic resources and associated traditional
knowledge).
190. See Zhiqian Wan & Mark Perry, Breeding Exemption in Plants Under
Intellectual Property Rights, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: HEGEMONY OR
HARMONY 99–109 (Lillian Corbin & Mark Perry eds., 2019) (providing context to
the development of various legal regimes under the International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants).
191. See id.; Nicholas Short, The Political Economy of the Research Exemption
in American Patent Law, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 573, 610–
12 (2016) (balancing encouraging research against economic incentives in
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UPOV created a new kind of intellectual property protection for
new plant varieties called breeders’ rights.192 The protection gave plant
breeders exclusive rights to sell invented, novel, and distinct, varieties
for a specified period of time.193 This was the first formal recognition
that plants had value beyond being physical commodities, and
recognized the product of breeders as valuable.194 The 1991 revision
of UPOV is characterized by a widening of the scope of rights granted
to breeders, a narrowing of the breeders’ exemption and a lengthening
of the duration of plant variety protection.195
Questions arise as to what kind of innovation these systems
encourage, discourage, or displace and whether, particularly in the
context of corporate consolidation, they encourage innovation at all.
IP systems do not support SSF innovation. In fact, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development found that privatization and
patenting of agricultural innovation has been displacing not only SSF
and traditional knowledge of seed, but also the right to save and replant
seeds harvested from their crops.196 By and large, SSF do not use IP
tools, which for the most part accommodate the needs of wellresourced actors and not the collective interests of rural
communities.197 The creation of new, locally-suitable crop varieties,
by mixing new and traditional varieties, is arguably the most critical
innovative activity supporting food and nutrition security.198 Yet IP
intellectual property law); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the TwentyFirst Century: Will Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. R. 1115,
1135–36 (2009) (suggesting that the development of patent law creates intricate and
overlapping patent laws that may hold up scientific development and result in
excessive litigation).
192. See International Convention for the Protection of new varieties of Plants,
Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter UPOV Convention].
193. See WIPO Introduction to UPOV, supra note 189, at 3 (outlining the
development of the UPOV Convention).
194. See UPOV Convention, supra note 193, arts. 1–2.
195. See id. at arts. 5, 19.
196. See WIPO Introduction to UPOV, supra note 189, at 1.
197. See SANDER HEHANUSSA & BURGHARD ILGE, UPOV 91 AND TRADE
AGREEMENTS: COMPROMISING FARMERS’ RIGHT TO SAVE AND SELL SEEDS,
https://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/upov_pub_221 (discussing the UPOV
changes and its effects on breeder’s rights); BRAGDON, FONDATION OF FOOD
SECURITY, supra note 87, at 14.
198. See Irene Musselli Moretti (Associate Expert, UNCTAD), Study on Tracking
the Trend Towards Market Concentration: The Case of the Agricultural Input
Industry, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2005/16, at iv, (Apr. 20, 2006).
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systems do not address the concerns of SSF, the central actors in this
system of innovation.199 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food says that patents and plant breeders’ rights, taken together,
“reward and encourage standardization and homogeneity, when what
should be rewarded is agrobiodiversity, particularly in the face of the
emerging threat of climate change.”200
Escalated by corporate consolidation, protection for plant-related
IPR led to innovation focused on a narrow range of crops, technologies
and approaches.201 This generated path dependencies that weaken
research on traditional crop varieties and social innovation
strategies.202 Focus on profits and market expansion resulted in
research and development (R&D) spending centered on crops and
technologies with the highest commercial returns, and in negligible
regard for investment in innovation related to crops that are most
important for SSF and the production of diverse, nutrient-rich diets.203
Additionally, the R&D agendas and patent monopolies of the “Big
Four”204—ASF, Bayer-Monsanto, DowDuPont and ChemChinaSyngenta—impede public interest in innovation for agricultural
systems producing diverse healthy foods without harming the
environment.205
Finally, it is doubtful that the IP system supports innovation in any
substantial way because highly concentrated markets, generally
199. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TOOLS FOR PRODUCTS
BASED ON BIOCULTURAL HERITAGE 10 (Nina Behrman & Frances Reynolds eds.,
2011).
200. See Bragdon, Reinvigorating the Public Sector, supra note 35, at 281.
201. See id. (noting that while SSF are the main creators of locally suitable crop
varieties the IPR system fails to address their concerns).
202. See Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim
Report on Seed Policies and the Right to Food: Enhancing Agrobiodiversity and
Encouraging Innovation, U.N. Doc. A/64/170, at 14 (July 23, 2009).
203. See J. Piesse & C. Thirtle, Agricultural R&D, Technology and Productivity,
365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 3035, 3042–47 (2010).
204. See Gil Gullickson, 10 Ag Mergers and Acquisitions From 2017,
SUCCESSFUL
FARMING
(Dec.
20,
2017),
https://www.agriculture.com/news/business/10-mergers-and-acquisitions-for-2017
(the big four are: BASF, Bayer-Monsanto, DowDuPont, and ChemChina-Syngenta).
205. See Hope Shand, The Big Six: A Profile of Corporate Power in Seeds,
Agrochemicals & Biotech, HERITAGE FARMS COMPANION 10, 10, 12–13 (2012)
(detailing the impediment to scientific research caused by the industry’s practice of
proprietary claims).
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speaking, often work against innovation.206 In the agri-food sector,
R&D spending remains high. However, a closer look reveals
disincentives to innovate, as dominant firms acquire innovators, often
squelching innovation, and engage in other “defensive modes of
R&D” rather than investing in the development of new ideas
themselves.207
Neoclassical economic thought today is a sharp departure from its
philosophical origins as it relates to trade and IP.208 For liberal
economists, particularly in the 19th century, free trade was promoted
as a means to challenge entrenched aristocratic privilege and industrial
monopolies, and to empower the manufacturing and working
classes.209 The goal was to reform government so that it would better
represent a range of interests.210 Today, trade agreements are
negotiated in secret, like a private contract.211 Agri-business—with
unprecedented, concentrated power212—plays a major role in shaping
the conduct of trade negotiations and the enforcement of

206. See WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX:
INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 49 (2004)
(using the American automotive industry as an example of a domineering group
stifling innovation).
207. See id. (describing defensive R&D tactics).
208. See Anthony Howe, Free Trade and the Repeal of the Corn Laws, LIBERAL
DEMOCRAT HISTORY GRP. (2004), https://liberalhistory.org.uk/history/free-tradeand-the-repeal-of-the-corn-laws/ (noting the origin of free trade characteristics
expressed in the agricultural sector); Jomo Kwame Sundram & Rudiger von Arnim,
Trade Liberalization and Economic Development, 323 SCIENCE 211, 211 (2009)
(explaining the economic theory of “new trade” that emphasizes variety).
209. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 209 (noting that the origin of promoting free
trade was based in disputes over land ownership which was then dominated by the
noble class at the expense of the people).
210. See id. (adding that there was a general rejection of monopoly in all forms).
211. See Orford, supra note 149, at 63; JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 510 (2000) (noting that even though some limited
forms of transparency are developing the general culture of trade negotiations
remains secretive).
212. See ELSADIG ELSHEIKH, HAAS INSTITUTE, THE ERA OF CORPORATE
CONSOLIDATION AND THE END OF COMPETITION: BAYER-MONSANTO, DOWDUPONT, AND CHEMCHINA-SYNGENTA 3–4 (Mark Abizeid ed., 2018) (highlighting
the major impact of the three corporate mergers that, if approved, would leave only
three multinational corporations thus greatly reducing competition); IPESFS, supra
note 69, at 6–7 (expanding on the potential impact of these ‘mega-mergers’ across
food systems).
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agreements.213 The terms of the negotiations are neither made public
nor made available to civil society organizations and social
movements. Even lawmakers have limited opportunity to intervene in
the negotiations.214 As noted by Orford: “The agenda that is being
furthered by free trade agreements entrenches the relationship between
states and transnational corporations that favours those corporations
over local peoples and communities. Such agreements attempt to limit
the capacity of governments to intervene in the economy for the
benefit of their people. . . .”215
Language, often fiercely negotiated, providing flexibility for
governments to support SSF and agricultural biodiversity is
ineffectual in the face of the forces described in this Section.216
Exploring the experience with the AoA and TRIPS, these limitations
are clear.217 The current round—called the Doha Development Round
(DDA) because of its strong language about the need to place the
needs of developing countries at the heart of its work program—was
launched by Member States in 2001.218 The Ministerial Declaration
launching the round also has strong language on a government’s right
to take action to protect ‘human, animal or plant life or health, or of
the environment at the levels it considers appropriate,’ and adds that
the WTO agreements must ensure ‘all people benefit from the
opportunity and welfare gains of trade.’219

213. See ELSHEIKH, supra note 213, at 8 (describing the impact of the
agribusinesses network of influencers on United States and European Union law);
IPESFS, supra note 69, at 5, 77 (adding that concentration of power has created a
“global governance of food systems”).
214. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 212, at 203, 209, 510 (emphasizing
the very limited access to the negotiation process despite their importance to a large
number of actors); Orford, supra note 149, at 63.
215. See Orford, supra note 149, at 64.
216. See id. at 54–55 (elaborating on the impediments to supporting SSF and
agricultural biodiversity).
217. See id. (accounting the conflict between the predicted increase in food prices
and the underlying liberal market foundation of the AoA).
218. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 175, at 56 (when established
implementation period of the AoA lasted six years (1995-2000) for developed
countries and 10 years (1995-2004) for developing countries. Article 20 of the AoA
included a provision for the continuation of the agricultural policy reform process.
The launching of the Doha Round and the inclusion of negotiations on agricultural
trade liberalization are in line with Article 20).
219. See Doha Declaration, supra note 144.
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Nevertheless, despite almost 20 years of discussions, AoA
negotiators have been unable to make significant progress on reducing
the imbalance in domestic agricultural subsidies, even though these
subsidies contribute to the spread of industrial agriculture, the
displacement of SSF and agrobiodiversity, and the harm of human and
planetary health.220
The DDA calls for the TRIPS Council to look at the relationship
between TRIPS, the CBD, and the protection of traditional knowledge
(TK) and folklore in its review of 27.3(b) of TRIPS.221 It further
instructs the Council that its work on these topics be guided by TRIPS’
objectives (Article 7) and principles (Article 8), and that the Council
must take development issues fully into account.222 Alison Slade
observes that “[b]y transcending treaty and forum boundaries, these
provisions not only influence interpretative practice, they also
encourage a convergence of policy objectives that facilitates greater
coherency within the international system, and links intellectual
property with other areas of socio-economic importance.”223
Since 2001, the ongoing discussions at the TRIPS Council about
codifying some CBD-related language into TRIPS demonstrate that
the language of Articles 7 and 8 and the DDA instructions did not
cause greater coherence in the international system, nor did they create
a better connection between IP and socio-economic objectives.224
Despite the regular examination of the relationship between the TRIPS
and the CBD, no clear consensus on how this relationship should be
reflected has emerged.225 Indeed, a majority of WTO members support
220. See, e.g., IPESFS, supra note 69, at 65 (describing the variety of current
environmental and public health risks created by the industrial food system as
widespread and escalating).
221. See Doha Declaration, supra note 144.
222. See TRIPS: Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, art. 7–8, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
223. See Alison Slade, Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement: A Force for
Convergence Within the International IP System, 14 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 413,
413 (2011) (noting this means that Article 7 and 8 are able to create a new legal and
policy perspective inclusive of all participating nations).
224. See id. at 429 (recognizing the current weak link between IP and other areas
but also that their inclusion in ACTA indicates a more concrete relationship).
225. See id. at 430–31 (concluding the current ability for Articles 7 and 8 to form
a consistent policy thread is significant but undefined).
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a move to negotiate on proposed changes to TRIPS to bring it into line
with, and be supportive of, the CBD.226 The DDA notwithstanding,
getting a mandate for such a negotiation seems unlikely, particularly
when the TRIPS Council, with 164 Parties,227 a subset of the CBD’s
196 Parties228, is unwilling to grant observer status to the CBD,
reflecting asymmetries of power between the two treaties.229
Some may argue that WTO stagnation indicates that industrialized
countries are not able to assert their power without check, also
demonstrating the limitations of corporate influence on
governments.230 On the contrary, entrenched interests, unable to
completely dominate in global, multilateral fora, are able to bypass
global agreements by pursuing regional and bilateral trade that
ultimately subvert globally agreed upon language.231
226. See Trade Negotiations Comm., Draft Decision to Enhance Mutual
Supportiveness Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, WTO Doc. TN/C/W/59 (Apr. 15, 2011) [hereinafter TRIPS 29bis].
227. See
WTO
Members
and
Observers,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/org6_e.htm.
228. List
of
Parties,
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml (last visited June 10, 2020).
229. See International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer
Status to WTO Bodies, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm
(last visited June 10, 2020) (reflecting the pending status of international IGOs
including CBD).
230. See Press Release, Mike Moore, Director-General of the World Trade
Organization, The WTO is Not a World Government and No One Has Any Intention
of
Making
it
One,
Moore
Tells
NGOs
(Nov.
29,
1999),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres99_e/pr155_e.htm (postulating that WTO
and GATT systems are a force for peace and guard against disorder).
231. See, e.g., PETER DRAPER ET AL., ECIPE, MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC
COUNTRIES 33, Paper No. 2/2014, (2014) (noting that governments can retain
significant autonomy to pursue policy measures outside of TPP talks); DEAN BAKER
ET AL., INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT: A BETTER SET
OF APPROACHES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 36 (2017) (adding that there has been a
movement towards “TRIPS-plus Provisions” typically made in bilateral
agreements); INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, A FAIR GLOBALIZATION:
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL 5 (2014) (arguing that developing countries do
not have the same advantages as developed countries); GRAIN, NEW TRADE DEALS
LEGALIZE CORPORATE THEFT, MAKE FARMERS’ SEEDS ILLEGAL 2 (2016),
https://www.grain.org/en/article/5511-new-trade-deals-legalise-corporate-theftmake-farmers-seeds-illegal (providing an update on free trade agreements made
outside the WTO that are harmful to SSFs); BEN LILLISTON, BIG MEAT SWALLOWS
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 3 (2014) (outlining how free trade agreements
like NAFTA have permitted secret negotiations that circumvent international
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C. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
A rights-based orientation is more likely to yield the types of
institutions, policies, and actions needed to fully support SSF and
agricultural biodiversity than market-based tools, like trade and IP
rules or biodiversity treaties that contain rights-based language only to
rely on transactional systems to generate support.232 Despite numerous
agreements and writings that directly or indirectly support SSF and the
management and development of agricultural biodiversity,233 the
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in the human rights realm
are weak compared to those in trade agreements.234
A global market economy governed by rules reflecting neoclassical
economics presents challenges to all international human rights law,
whether it is the Right to Food, Farmer’s Rights of the IT, or
implementation of the recently adopted Declaration on the Rights of
Peasants.235 Daniel Augenstein encapsulates the problem:
standards and are harmful to SSFs).
232. See Nicole Aylwin & Rosemary J. Coombe, Marks Indicating Conditions of
Origin in Rights-Based Sustainable Development, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753, 757–
64 (2014) (finding that rights-based approaches take social and economic rights
seriously).
233. See John H. Knox (Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable
Environment), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/49, at 1 (Jan. 19, 2017) (opining on the
importance of biodiversity); OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AND THE POST-GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AGENDA, PUTTING FOOD
SECURITY FIRST IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM: BRIEFING NOTE 4, at 1,
(2011),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/deschutter_2011_e.pdf
(assessing the WTO’s ability to protect the right to food); Right to Food Timeline,
FAO, https://www.webcitation.org/68Cm7UmiN (last visited June 20, 2020)
(showing that the Human Rights Council found a right to food in 2000); Special
Rapporteur
on
the
Right
to
Food,
OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx (last visited June 20,
2020) (describing the right to food).
234. See James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, How are Trade Disputes Resolved?,
COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-aretrade-disputes-resolved (noting the prevalence of trade dispute forums, agreements,
cases, and settlements, as well as the strength of the WTO’s arbitration forum).
235. See Margot E. Salomon & Colin Arnott, Better Development DecisionMaking: Applying International Human Rights Law to Neoclassical Economics, 32
NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 44, 47 (2014) (exploring the deficiencies in the ability to
provide equal water access for all because neoliberal principles encourage the
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. . . [T]he exposure of the international legal order of states to the operations
of global corporate power leads to a collusion of sovereign state interest
and globalised corporate power to the detriment of victims of human rights
violations in the global market economy. This collusion is rooted in a
tension between the global human rights impacts of states’ business-related
domestic and foreign policies and their sovereign territorial rights to
independently conduct their domestic and foreign affairs. 236

Augestein goes on:
The distinction between the ‘territorial’ and ‘extraterritorial’ that was once
premised on the equal sovereign entitlements and responsibilities of states
to protect human rights within their territory unleashes global market forces
from the constraints of international law. This crisis of the state-centered
conception of international human rights law – the ‘business and human
rights predicament’- stems less from a marginalization of sovereign states
than from a transformation of their international relations in the global
market economy.237

Heavily influenced by increasingly concentrated agribusiness, trade
and IP rules reached into the domestic sphere of sovereign states in
unprecedented ways, limiting the capacity of governments to
intervene to on behalf of local people and communities, including
SSF.238 Despite the willingness of states to use extra-territorial
regulation to promote global trade and IP rules, there is a reluctance to
resort to such measures in the context of human rights.239 This
reluctance by the human rights sphere, combined with its disparate
means of enforcement, effectively amounts to a hierarchy of
exclusion of this resource from the most impoverished members of society and that
neoliberal principles often result in a failure to apply the requirements of human
rights).
236. Augenstein, supra note 130, at 43.
237. Id. at 59.
238. See id. at 44 (noting the pressure that economic globalization asserts on
governments in developed countries to promote capital flow and the pressure on
governments in developing countries to maintain a competitive advantage by
slowing the advancement of social and environmental protections at the cost of
hurting SSFs and local communities).
239. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business
Enterprises), Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the
Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶¶ 44–47,
50, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Business and Human
Rights].
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international law, where powerful economic interests prevail over the
public interest in sustainable agricultural practices that provide healthy
and nutritious food.240 Coherence across instruments is not possible in
such an environment.241
The dilemma created by this situation can be seen in the adoption
of a more recent human rights instrument of direct relevance to the
ability of SSF to sustainably produce healthy, diverse diets: the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in
Rural Areas adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its
73rd Session in December 2018.242
Australia, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States all voted against the adoption of the
Declaration.243 There were 54 abstentions including most of the
European Union countries,244 along with countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea.245
The Declaration aims to better protect the rights of all rural
populations, including peasants, fisherfolks, nomads, agricultural
workers, and indigenous peoples.246 For example, Article 16 calls for
strengthening and protecting local livelihood options and the transition
to sustainable modes of agricultural production,247 while Article 17
concerns the right to land.248
Article 19 deals with the right to seeds, including the right to protect
traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture, and the right to equitably participate in sharing the benefits
arising from the use of plant genetic resources for food and

240. See Augenstein, supra note 130, at 55–56 (arguing that governments have
responded to the development of the global market by promoting the economic
interests of corporations over political interventions for the public good).
241. See id. at 44 (finding that the relationship between businesses and human
rights has created an international legal order of cooperation between businesses and
states to the detriment of human rights).
242. G.A. Res. 73/165 (Dec. 17, 2018).
243. See U.N. GOAR, 73rd Sess., 55th plen. mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. A/73/PV.55
(Dec. 17, 2018).
244. Id. at 25.
245. Id.
246. See G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 243, at 4–5.
247. See id. at 12.
248. See id. at 12–13.
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agriculture.249 Article 19 states that peasants have the right to maintain,
control, protect and develop their own seeds and traditional
knowledge.250 While a declaration is not considered legally-binding,
Article 19 has several provisions stating that “states shall”:
x take measures “to respect, protect and fulfil the right to
seeds of peasants and other people working in rural
areas,”251
x “ensure that seeds of sufficient quality and quantity are
available to peasants at the most suitable time for planting
and at an affordable price,” and252
x “ensure that seed policies, plant variety protection and other
intellectual property laws, certification schemes and seed
marketing laws respect and take into account the rights,
needs and realities of peasants and other people working in
rural areas.”253
Article 19’s language in this U.N. Declaration on the protection of
traditional knowledge, to share equitably in benefits and the right to
save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed is consistent with the
language of Article 9 of the IT on Farmers’ Rights.254 Ironically, with
the exception of Israel and New Zealand, all those voting against the
adoption of the Declaration are parties to the IT.255 Many of those
voting no, as well as many who abstained, expressed concerns about
the creation of collective rights, stating human rights apply to
individuals, not groups.256 Concerns over collective rights were also
expressed in conjunction with disagreement with the notion that
categories of individuals should be created that merit special
249. See id. at 14.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 243, at 14.
253. Id.
254. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, supra note 19, art. 9.
255. See Membership, INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
FOR
FOOD
AND
AGRICULTURE,
FAO
http://www.fao.org/planttreaty/countries/membership/en/ (last visited July 28, 2020).
256. See Press Release, Approving 9 Drafts, Third Comm. Intensifies Fight
Against Fistula, Genital Mutilation, Sexual Harassment Amid Debate Over
Peasants’ Rights, U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4255 (Nov. 19, 2018), (providing the
explanation from the representative of the United States as to why they voted no).
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treatment.257
Disregarding other international law containing rights-based
language such as the CBD and the IT, he United States explained its
vote in part, saying “the rights to seeds, to return to the land, to use
traditional farming, to biological diversity do not exist under
international human rights law.”258 Sweden echoed this concern.259
Ethiopia, also a party to the IT, explained its abstention stating that the
human rights of peasants should be limited to the territory of the
State.260

D. AGENDA 2030 AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2030,
adopted by the global community in September 2015, apply to all
countries with the commitment “that no one is left behind.”261 As an
agenda for planet, people, peace, partnership, and prosperity, Agenda
2030 provides a vision for people- and human rights-based, gender
sensitive and planet-centered and sustainable development.262 Target
17.14 of the SDGs commits all UN Member States to pursue policy
coherence and a favorable environment for sustainable development
by all actors and at all levels.263 Therefore, the SDGs go beyond efforts
like the DDA, which merely encourages an alignment of policy
objectives and policy coherence, by actually requiring adherence.264
SSF and agricultural biodiversity are critical to achieving key aspects
of most of the SDGs.265 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, and its 17 SDGs, therefore could serve as a unifying
framework for supporting SSF, climate resiliency and diversified
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 57, at 4.
262. See id. at 2, 17.
263. See id. at 27.
264. See id.
265. See Bragdon, supra note 1, at 158; see also United Nations System Standing
Committee on Nutrition [UNSCN], Expert Group Meeting on Nutrition and SDGs
under Review in Preparation for the High-Level Political Forum, at 9 (June 20,
2018),
https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/Final-Report-of-EGM-onnutrition.pdf (encouraging member states to acknowledge the importance of
agricultural biodiversity to the SDGs and noting that agricultural biodiversity is
practiced by small scale farmers who produce the majority of the world food supply).

2020] SMALL-SCALE FARMERS & AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY

45

farming systems, and diverse healthy diets. Thus far, however,
Agenda 2030 and its SDGs are not delivering on this promise.266
Of particular relevance to SSF, agricultural biodiversity, and
nutrition is the disconnect between SDG 2 “End hunger”267 and SDG
15 “Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and
reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss.”268 Despite SDG 15’s
importance to the health of both people and the planet, the broad
understanding of what constitutes agricultural biological diversity, and
the critical role played by custodians of agricultural biological
diversity, receives no explicit mention in the Sustainable Development
Goals, including SDG 15.269
Further, progress on making this connection also has been
minimal.270 An Expert Group Meeting (EGM) was convened to review
implementation of SDG 15 prior to its review at the High-Level
Political Forum (HLPF) in July 2018.271 The Background Document
for the EGM noted that the goal is not just an environmental goal, it is
also a social and economic one.272 Nevertheless, the Background
Document goes on to emphasize the ‘protection of nature’ as if
synonymous with SDG 15.273 The note mentions connections to other
SDGs in many instances, but to SDG 2 only once.274 More
significantly,275 the key messages sent to the HLPF for its
consideration of SDG 15 (HLPF members are unlikely to read
266. See Cameron Allen et al., Initial Progress in Implementing the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs): A Review of Evidence from Countries, 13
SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 1453, 1465 (2018) (acknowledging the transformative
potential of the SDGs and highlighting implementation gaps resulting in the failure
to effectively implement the SDGs in developing and developed countries alike).
267. See G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 57, at 15–16.
268. See id. at 24–25.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See UN-DESA Division for Sustainable Development Goals, Background
Note on Expert Group Meeting on Preparation for HLPF 2018, at 1 (May 14-15,
2018) [hereinafter EGM Background Note].
272. See id. at 19–20.
273. See id. at 4.
274. See id. at 7, 9.
275. See High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, Background
Note on Lessons Learned from the First Cycle of the HLPF and Messages for 2019
HLPF Summit: What Should Heads of State and Government Know and How Can
We Improve HLPF?, 5 (2019) [hereinafter HLPF Background Note] (opining on the
deluge of information that must be sifted through by HLPF participants).
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background notes to multiple EGMs) makes no reference to SDG 2.276
The separation between the negotiations on Agenda 2030 and
debates about financing for development also reveal the limitations of
language.277 This separation reflects developed countries’ desire to
ensure that discussion, decisions, and implementation of international
finance policy take place in institutions and processes in which they
dominate such as the International Monetary Financial Committee, the
Development Committee of the World Bank, and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.278
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development
(AAAA) was adopted in Addis Ababa in 2015 at the Third
International Conference on Financing for Development, three months
prior to the adoption of Agenda 2030.279 The relationship between
AAAA and Agenda 2030 was the subject of significant debate in
Addis Ababa.280 Prior Financing for Development outcomes had no
formal links to the Millennium Development Goals,281 the predecessor
to the SDGs.282 The tension between a ‘stand-alone’ and a ‘fully
integrated’ outcome was resolved by agreeing that the two processes
would continue in parallel, but with formal links.283 Agenda 2030
states “[t]he Addis Ababa Action Agenda supports, complements, and
helps contextualize the 2030 Agenda’s means of implementation

276. See UN-DESA Division for the Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainable
Development Goal 15: Progress and Prospect. Outcome: Key Messages, at 2, 3
(May 2018) [hereinafter EGM Key Messages] (mentioning SDG 15 but not SDG 2).
277. See Manuel F. Montes, Five Points on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, 24
SOUTH CTR. POL’Y BRIEF, 1–3 (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.southcentre.int/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/PB24_Five-points-on-Addis-Ababa-ActionAgenda_EN.pdf, (addressing the strong language and lack of action promoted by the
Addis Ababa Action Agenda).
278. See id.
279. See G.A. Res. 69/313, at 1–2 (Aug. 17, 2015).
280. See Addis: UN Negotiations Resume on Financing Framework to Advance
Global
Development,
U.N.
NEWS
(July
14,
2015),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/07/504222-addis-un-negotiations-resumefinancing-framework-advance-global-development (explaining the large points of
debate).
281. See International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey
Consensus on Financing for Development, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/11, annex
(Mar. 1822, 2002) [hereinafter Monterrey Consensus].
282. See id. at 5.
283. See id.
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targets.”284
The separation between the two Agendas advances the call for
financing mechanisms—such as public-private partnerships (PPPs)—
yet these mechanisms have failed to achieve development goals. 285
The AAAA states that “both public and private investment have key
roles to play in infrastructure financing, including through . . . public
private partnerships.”286 In general, PPPs have not achieved the
promises they made in the form of efficiency, improved provision of
traditionally “public goods,” and increased economic gains (except for
those accruing to the industry actors themselves).287 A review of PPPs’
successes, as measured by their contribution to achieving development
goals, conserving biodiversity, protecting SSF livelihoods, and
increasing the supply of affordable and nutrient-dense food, found
them to be more harmful than helpful.288
PPPs are problematic for multiple reasons. On the private sector end
of the partnership is the global, concentrated agri-food industry, with
a high likelihood for conflicts of interest between corporate actors and
the public interest in food systems that are healthy for people and the
planet.289 On the public sector end of the partnership, PPPs bring
284. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 57, at 28.
285. Compare EVERT-JAN QUAK & NICOLE METZ, FOOD & BUS. KNOWLEDGE
PLATFORM, BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS WITH WHOM? QUICK SCAN OF THE KEY
ACTORS IN FOOD SECURITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 6–7 (2015),
https://knowledge4food.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/150519_fbkpstakeholder_analysis_PPP.pdf (highlighting OECD nations’ reliance on PPPs to
achieve development goals), with Karin Bäckstrand & Mikael Kylsäter, Old Wine in
New Bottles? The Legitimation and Delegitimation of UN Public–Private
Partnerships for Sustainable Development from the Johannesburg Summit to the
Rio+20 Summit, 11 GLOBALIZATIONS 331, 332 (2014) (questioning the legitimacy
and efficacy of PPPs) and Frank Biermann et al., Multi—Stakeholder Partnerships
for Sustainable Development: Does the Promise Hold?, DEP’T OF ENVTL. POL’Y
ANALYSIS, INST. FOR ENVTL. STUD., VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT, AMSTERDAM, (2007), at
2, (contesting the role and relevance of PPPs).
286. G.A. Res. 69/313, supra note 280, at 15–16.
287. See Bäckstrand & Kylsäter, supra note 286, at 332 (demonstrating the gap
between actual and official legitimacy of PPPs).
288. See Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 14, at 1290–91 (stating that PPPs overly
rely on bringing small farmers into the industrial value chain).
289. See OXFAM, MORAL HAZARD? ‘MEGA’ PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN
AFRICAN AGRICULTURE 25–26 (2014), https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fspublic/file_attachments/oxfam_moral_hazard_pppagriculture-africa-010914embargo-en.pdf (showing the harmful environmental impacts of large scale PPPs);
see also CLAPP, supra note 159, at 26–28 (focusing on the long-term food security
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inherent risk due to lack of capacity, challenges to regulations,290 and
the small number of institutions able to represent groups such as
SSF.291
PPPs in agricultural development are part of the shift in narrative
about the role of government, away from public good and toward the
supremacy of markets and industry.292 The effect is to contract
traditional areas of public research and extension, and to alter national
and regional priorities and practice, thereby reducing opportunities for
a more participatory, farmer-led approach.293 If PPPs are to be
effective in achieving the SDGs and supporting the sustainable
production of affordable and nutrient dense food, the private sector
part of the partnership must focus on SSF as private actors, and not
corporate agribusiness.294 Ultimately, one must challenge the
assumption that the private sector and markets be allowed to operate
freely in this context.

IV.

THE WAY FORWARD

SSF and agricultural biodiversity are a foundation for healthy,
sustainable food systems. Abandoning either to the spread of uniform,
large-scale agriculture comes with irreversible cost to human and
planetary health. The solution begins with exposing the inadequacy of
the market-solutions and the dangers that agri-food-industryinfluenced policies pose to these communities and resources.295 This
exposure creates opportunity to address the root causes of the hungerrisks posed by excessive PPP use).
290. See OXFAM, supra note 290, at 15 (exploring the deleterious effects PPPs
have in countries without strong governance, using sub-Saharan African countries
as examples); Bragdon, Reinvigorating the Public Sector, supra note 35, at 286
(examining how liberalization and globalization can harm SSFs when the right
policies are not in place to protect them).
291. See OXFAM, supra note 290, at 15 (highlighting how SSFs and their interests
often get left behind when PPPs are formed).
292. See id.
293. See Kojo Sebastian Amanor, From Farmer Participation to Pro-Poor Seed
Markets: The Political Economy of Commercial Cereal Seed Networks in Ghana,
42 IDS BULLETIN 48, 54 (2011) (covering how Ghana’s implementation of PPPs
alters local and regional priorities and policy frameworks); David Spielman et al.,
Public-Private Partnerships in International Agricultural Research, J. TECH.
TRANSFER, at 5 (2006) (addressing exclusivity in PPPs).
294. See Bragdon & Hayes, supra note 14, at 1312.
295. See supra Introduction.
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nutrition-health crisis through systemic, structural change, including
the reinvigoration of accountable, democratic governance from the
local to global levels.296
Negotiations to get the language “right” in multiple venues will
have limited effect without systemic and structural change. It is in this
context that international declarations, rules, and processes can begin
to provide support for SSF and agricultural biodiversity and enable the
wider diffusion of the agroecological approaches of which SSF and
agricultural biodiversity are an integral part. Systemic change requires
local action combined with influence at the global level of policies and
institutions.297
Entrenched economic, social, and political forces have converged
to support a uniform, industrial system of agriculture that undermines
diversity and SSF, and the drives global dissemination of a food
system that makes people sick.298 It is not enough to pull into a
farmers’ market in an electric car and buy organic cheese directly from
a local farmer. It is not enough to be content with improving
agricultural production systems within one’s own communities,
hoping such improvement is part of an evolution to healthier food
systems. The economic, social, and political challenges must be
overcome in the international arenas where they arise. If not, the best
we can hope for are geographic and time-limited ‘islands of
success.’299
Local action and consumer choice cannot transform a food system
without changing macro-level policies and systems.300 Dislodging
entrenched interests requires broad-based alliances that extend beyond
296. See Jens Martens, Revisiting the Hardware of Sustainable Development, in
RESHAPING GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY 11, 13 (2019) (advocating for more
local and small-scale farmer control of the rules that govern them).
297. See id. at 11.
298. See Laura Michele et al., SDG 2: Human Rights Risks of Multi-stakeholder
Partnerships: The Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative, in RESHAPING GOVERNANCE FOR
SUSTAINABILITY 103, 103, 106 (2019) (highlighting the overreliance on
biotechnological solutions).
299. See Martens, supra note 297, at 12 (advocating for more local and smallscale farmer control).
300. See, e.g., David Boys, Towards a New Approach to Public Infrastructure
Provision, in RESHAPING GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY 139, 139 (2019)
(examining the movement toward re-municipalizing social and environmental
priorities).
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food systems, creating common cause with others affected by
corporate concentration, privatization, de-regulation, and marketbased solutions.301 As noted in Section 2, market-based solutions have
been imposed to the detriment of the public interest in the fields of
health, education, public safety, criminal justice, environmental
protection, and other social goods.302 Those working for change in
each of these arenas are potential allies in systems transformation. For
example, there is renewed concern about corporate concentration with
technology platforms and companies.303 Those concerned are potential
allies in negotiating global anti-trust rules in a venue that addresses
asymmetries of power. Effecting change requires both opposing that
which prevents change and building to extend the reach of that which
works. Food has the potential to be a powerful unifier to join forces
across issues with the shared goal of countering the forces that prevent
change. Extending the reach of the positive experience in this Article
and elsewhere necessitates increased awareness across geographies
and cultures of the systemic challenges, and forging partnerships to
influence policy from farm to fork.
It is a moment in time like never before. While experienced
unevenly, hunger, malnutrition, and obesity are touching all parts of
the world.304 With the right people, in the right places, with the right
tools and the right messages, it is possible to see the crucial connection
between SSF and agricultural biodiversity and healthy, nutritious diets
supported and implemented at a global scale.

301. See id.
302. See supra Section II.
303. See Cecilia Kang et al., Google and Amazon Are at the Center of a Storm
Brewing
Over
Big
Tech,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(June
3,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/business/google-antitrust-investigation.html
(examining the regulatory sphere of the technology industry).
304. See Swinburn et al., supra note 8, at 791.

